Deleuze and Guattari: Jean Hillier in Conversation with Gareth Abrahams by Hillier, J & Abrahams, G
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI
EXPLORING FOUNDATIONS 
FOR PLANNING THEORY
Jean Hillier
Gareth Abrahams
Jean Hillier in conversation with Gareth Abrahams
AESOP
EXPLORING FOUNDATIONS 
FOR PLANNING THEORY
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI 
INTRODUCTION 
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI
Gareth Abrahams 
Cardiff University 
Jean Hillier in conversation with Gareth Abrahams
GARETH ABRAHAMS
AESOP        YOUNG ACADEMIC NETWORK
Deleuze’s seminal texts are notoriously difficult to read, and even more difficult to relate to the work we do in our day-to-day lives as planning theorists and practi-tioners. One of the reasons for this difficulty can be found in Deleuze’s eclectic 
references to other specialist disciplines: biology, differential geometry, psychiatry, 
linguistics and art amongst others. Spending many hours poring over biological descrip-
tions of ginger, or staring into Bacon’s distorted faces will leave many of our most 
important questions unanswered. And if we put these questions to one side, we soon find 
that modelling a road layout on the growth patterns of a ground stem vegetable produces a 
pretty image but an impractical plan. 
 The reason is that Deleuze does not simply use these images as metaphors for 
his philo-sophy. Rather, he re-creates them into concepts with a very specific function. 
Thus, the rhizome, the assemblage, the machine, the universal singularity, the multiplicity 
and the virtual diagram should be seen as concepts that do something very specific. As 
many Deleuzean scholars have noted, Deleuze’s philosophy is not concerned with what 
something is, its inherent traits or essence, but what it does, what it might do, how it might 
affect what other things do and how it might be affected by them (Bryant, 2008; DeLanda, 
2002; 2006; Bonta and Protevi, 2004). Thus, when we read Deleuze’s texts, we must ask 
ourselves, ‘what does this concept do in Deleuze’s philosophical project?’ and, by extension, 
‘what might this concept do for planning?’ If Deleuze is to change the way we work, 
therefore, we must start by exploring his understanding of reality (his ontology), and then 
consider how bringing this ontology into planning might help us re-think some our most 
fundamental assumptions and tools.   
 
 Identifying Deleuze’s ontology is not a simple task. As Jean Hillier notes later 
in this publication, there is some dispute amongst Deleuzian scholars about whether we 
should talk about a Deleuzian ontology or several. Indeed, this plurality can be seen across 
Deleuzian scholarship.  Manuel DeLanda, for example, discusses what he regards as 
Deleuze’s realist ontology (DeLanda, 2002), his virtual-actual ontology (DeLanda, 2002), 
and his non-essentialist ontology (DeLanda, 2006). Later in this publication, Hillier refers 
to an ontology of difference as well as a post-structuralist ontology. Rather than revealing 
contradictions, these different frames offer us a variety of starting points for navigating 
through Deleuze key ideas and, by extension, through our own work. With this in mind, 
I would like to draw on an ontological frame that I believe could be particularly suited to 
planning. This frame is drawn from DeLanda’s careful reading of Deleuze’s three realms of 
reality: the actual, the processes of actualisation and the virtual (DeLanda, 2002).  
 
 The first of these realms is the easiest for us to visualise because it forms the 
world we see around us. In Deleuze’s work, the actual is comprised of human and non-
human entities, which might include the planner, the client, the houses, trees, people, birds, 
worms, flowers and pebbles on a site. However, for Deleuze, whilst this actual realm is the 
easiest for us to visualise, we must not limit our understanding of reality to the observa-
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tions we draw from these entities. Above I said that we can learn little about Deleuze’s 
philosophy by staring at a piece of ginger or a painting. The same argument applies here. 
For Deleuze, we will learn very little about the actual realm by staring at a bird, a flower 
and a pebble and trying to determine what they are. These entities and their discernible 
properties only provide us with an ‘image’. They tell us almost nothing about how they 
came into being, how they might change over time to form new beings, what they might do, 
how they might affect what other things might do and be affected by them. To understand 
these aspects of reality, Deleuze suggests, we must understand the realm that precedes the 
actual, or, what we might term, the ‘pre-actual’ or the ‘pre-individual’ (DeLanda, 2002).  
 
 Whilst the ‘pre-actual’ is not visible, it is, nonetheless, fundamental to plan-
making practice. When we form a plan, either as planners, master-planners or architects, 
we do so by imagining what might become of the entities we see around us, and what other 
entities or group of entities might come into being. Plans, we might argue, set-out a world 
that has yet to be actualised, formed from potentials to become something. 
 
 Yet, anyone who has worked in these professions will have realised that such 
plans are likely to be revised many times as we move through different periods of time 
or across different spatial scales.  A visit to the Council’s planning archive will reveal how 
many times a local area plan has been revised over the last forty years, and working in an 
architect’s office will reveal how many times a building design changes as it moves from 
inception to completion. This is because we cannot imagine everything that may or may 
not happen in the future. Some becomings are simply beyond our imagination and our 
sensory observation of the world around us (Bryant, 2008; Williams, 2008). 
 
 For Deleuze, this captures an important ontological point. As human entities, we 
can only access a small part of the pre-actual: the part that surrounds the actual entities 
that we identify as important. Thus, when a planner imagines what might become of the 
houses, trees, flowers and pebbles on a given site, or how introducing a new road or a 
new policy might affect that site, they can only base these speculations on what they can 
observe.  
   
 But, we might ask, what about the parts of the pre-actual that we cannot access? 
Or, put differently, if we were able to map these becomings further beyond the actual, 
where would this take us? To answer this question, Deleuze introduces us to the idea of 
a virtual realm. This realm, he suggests, is formed from becomings that have yet to begin 
this movement towards the actual. This is a realm formed from ‘pure’ potentials to become, 
with no pre-defined template determining what they might become, or how they might 
become (DeLanda, 2002; Hillier, 2007).  
 
 This area of Deleuze’s ontology presents us with a number of abstract concepts 
intended to explore how pure becomings might structure this virtual realm, both as 
AESOP        YOUNG ACADEMIC NETWORK
clusters (virtual diagrams, or multiplicities) and as a sequence of clusters (planes of 
immanence). To respond to the confusion that has surrounded these concepts over the last 
few years, several Deleuzian scholars have published detailed glossaries and dictionaries 
(see Parr, 2005; 2010 for example). After reading these definitions, many planners might 
conclude that such concepts are too abstract to be of any practical use to plan-making. 
When studied in their philosophical form, this is probably not an unreasonable conclusion 
to make. However, as I noted above, we must not simply ask what Deleuze’s concepts are, 
but what they do, and, more importantly, what they might do for planning.  
 
 This line of enquiry forms the basis of Hillier’s 2007 monograph. For Hillier, the 
virtual realm, and the concept of the plane of immanence in particular, provides us with a 
new way of thinking about strategic plan-making. As I noted above, planners typically start 
with the actual, move into the pre-actual and then back into the actual. When they do this, 
the intention is not to explore becomings in their own right, but to explore the becomings 
that are likely to be actualised. Or, in other words, the focus of existing methods of plan-
making are always anchored around the actual realm. But by introducing this other, virtual 
realm Hillier suggests that planners can explore a new focus.  This new focus, suggests 
Hillier, demands that we imagine ‘what might be’ (becomings), without thinking too hard 
about how they might be actualised in practice, or what they might be actualised into. 
This idea is captured in Hillier’s call for us to ‘Stretch beyond the horizon’ (Hillier, 2007): 
to stretch our imagination beyond the world we see around us and towards the virtual. In 
doing so, Hillier sets planners with a new challenge, however impossible it might be…. 
 
	 ‘A	conversation:	what	is	it,	what	is	it	for?’
 
 This publication is structured around a number of ‘conversations with planners’. 
But, we might ask, what do we mean when we talk about a conversation, and what is 
this conversation for? This question is considered in Deleuze’s work with Claire Parnet 
(Deleuze and Parnet, 2002). Deleuze argues that most conversations are structured around 
a number of dualisms both in the form of the conversation (the interviewer/interviewee; 
the question/answer), and the content of the conversation (do you think this or that?) 
These dualisms, he argues, can often lead us into instances in which the ‘aim is not to 
answer questions (but) to get out’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 1). This is made all the more 
problematic, he suggests, because most questions are ‘already worked out on the basis of 
the answers assumed to be probable according to the dominant meanings’ (Deleuze and 
Parnet, 2002: 15). Thus, rather than creating something new, these questions and answers 
re-trace taken-for-granted relationships between selected ideas. ‘Western democratic 
conversation between friends’ write Deleuze and Guattari, ‘has never produced the slightest 
concept’ (1994: 6). If we should focus our attention on creating concepts, as Deleuze and 
Guattari (1994) suggest, then should we discard conversations as a meaningful contri-
bution to such an exercise? 
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  The easy answer to this question is, no. As with many of Deleuze’s arguments, 
he does not break-down existing ways of thinking and working without offering us a 
replacement. Indeed, ‘the conversation’ is an important part of Deleuze’s later texts written 
in collaboration with the psychotherapist and political activist, Félix Guattari. We can 
see this in the opening to A Thousand Plateaus, which reads, ‘the two of us wrote Anti-
Oedipus together. Since each of us was several, there was quite a crowd’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987: 3). 
 
 Here Deleuze and Guattari show us that, to be productive, the conversation 
must include the collection (or multiplicity) of becomings that that we have drawn from 
other encounters, other conversations in other disciplines and other lines of enquiry. In 
Dialogues II, Deleuze expands on this by discussing instances when Deleuze and Guattari 
were both working on the same concept, ‘body without organs’, but did not grasp it in 
the same way. Inversely, he discusses an instance when they were working on two very 
different concepts as part of two different lines of enquiry. Yet, by bringing these together 
in a conversation, these concepts formed a new encounter, an ‘outline of a becoming’ 
(Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 2) that did not belong to either of them, but ‘worked between 
the two’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 13). Returning to my introduction, we might argue 
that a conversation, like a plan, sits somewhere between the actual and the virtual. And like 
a plan, our role in a conversation is not to focus on that which has already been actualised, 
(such as pre-conceived ideas), but on that which might come into being. 
 
	 So	what	does	this	mean	for	my	conversation	with
	 planning	theorist,	Jean	Hillier?	
 There are clear and obvious differences between Deleuze’s conversation with 
Guattari and my conversation with Hillier. However, this does not preclude us from using 
their arguments to re-learn ‘the art of conversation’. My conversation with Hillier is not 
intended to resolve the link between planning and Deleuze, or to explain how and why 
Hillier’s link should be used as the basis for other planners interested in ‘Stretching beyond 
the horizon’.  
 
 As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, Hillier and I both bring to this conversation 
different combinations of becomings, pulling us towards different ways of reading, under-
standing and, most importantly, (re)creating concepts. Keeping this in mind, we have made 
no attempt made to bring these readings into neat, conclusive points. As Hillier noted in 
her review of consensus-building, we must not start with the transcendental ideal of a 
coherent end-point in which a range of actors will agree on a single direction for the future 
(Hillier, 2003; 2007).  
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 The way we move through a conversation is as important as the way we envisage 
what we hope to achieve from that conversation. Drawing on Deleuze’s argument, it was 
important that the questions I asked did not feel like a pre-conceived trap from which 
Hillier’s ‘aim is not to answer questions (but) to get out…’. Thus, questions were asked as 
they arose, without any idea as to how they would link to each other, what the response 
might be, or whether they would support previous or future questions. This fluidity is 
captured in the formatting, where questions and answers sit within the body of the text 
rather than as a stand-alone interview. For me, these questions and answers mark an 
encounter: the earliest outline of a becoming that might lead us into new conversations 
with Deleuze, with other planners or/and with each other.  
 
 
1 Page references to Deleuze and Guattari’s work are for the English language editions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
JEAN HILLIER
A fter World War 2 in much of Europe and North America, cities were subject to intense processes of reconstruction, slum clearance and urban renewal. Grounded in centralised planning schemes – a legacy of wartime tactics – urban 
redevelopment was expected to solve problems of housing quality and shortages, traffic 
congestion, retail provision and so on in an ‘orderly’ manner. Whether utilising zoning  
or local area planning schemes, the intention was to generate ‘an orderly city life’   
(May, 2005: 163).
 However, in many respects the grand schemes failed, as residential areas were 
bulldozed for urban motorways, low income/public sector high rise developments 
rehoused inner city inhabitants kilometres away from their families and friends and 
monozoned city centres sank into decline faced with the rise of out-of-town shopping 
and a lack of reasons for office-workers to stay in town after hours. More recently, urban 
planners have sought to regenerate city centres along lines suggested by, for example, 
Comedia (1991), Charles Landry (1995), John Montgomery (1995) and Richard Florida 
(2003, 2004, 2009, 2011).
 But what these authors and the planners overlooked, and what Deleuze and 
Guattari would have told them, is that cities are not simply matters of function; rather, 
they are matters of connection (May, 2005: 165). It is the relations between humans and 
non-humans (land uses etc.) in the city which generate feelings of community, vibrance, 
isolation, fear and so on. In an urban assemblage, constituent elements change their 
composition as they come into relationships with other elements. For instance, a city centre 
motorway underpass may transform from a convenient office-worker thronged short-cut 
to the railway station in rush-hour to a threatening hang-out for the homeless or drug-
users after the station closes at night.
 Cities are machinic in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms. Although some form of 
order actualises, it bears little resemblance to a predetermined plan or design guide. Order 
emerges instead from the specific contexts of relations between elements in assemblages 
which both create and are created by the elements themselves. Deleuze and Guattari would 
argue that rather than thinking in terms of known needs and solutions (such as to housing 
provision, retail and commercial floorspace provision etc.), planners should think about 
relational connections between elements and what might happen if …… This would be to 
regard cities as machinic assemblages, with actualisations of virtual difference.
 The work of Deleuze and Guattari is relatively little known (even less under-
stood), however, by planning scholars and practitioners. The aim of this short book is to 
highlight some of the concepts which Deleuze and Guattari develop in their work and 
which might be useful for those involved in spatial planning research and practice to 
consider. It is obviously impossible to cover all of Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas in a short 
volume, so I have selected those which I think might be most appropriate. There are 
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several good Deleuzean Dictionaries and Introductions to Deleuze and Guattari’s work 
in different languages which explain the concepts considered below, and more, for those 
wishing to read further. With apologies for predominantly citing references in English, 
see, in particular, Dictionaries by Parr (2010), Zourabichvili (2004) and that in Bonta and 
Protevi (2004), while Stivale (2005) provides a strong explanation of many concepts. 
Also of value are Introductions by Colebrook (2002, 2006), Goodchild (1996), May (2005) 
and Patton (2010) and, in relation to architecture/the city, Ballantyne (2007), Bonta and 
Protevi (2004), Buchanan and Lambert (2005), Grosz (2001) and Rajchman (1998, 2000). 
A collection of essays on Deleuze and the City is under construction at time of writing, to 
be published by Edinburgh University Press in 2014 or 2015.
 Why Deleuze and Guattari?
 There is much debate over whether there is a Deleuzean ontology as such, or
even several ontologies. For me, one of the great attractions of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
writings is that they reject the rigidity that ontologies can sometimes fall into. A Deleuzean 
– or Deleuzoguattarian – ontology would be an ontology of difference: of the new, of 
change and transformation; which is what spatial planning is all about. A Deleuzean 
ontology of difference would be concerned with continual creation. This means that 
questions, such as ‘what might the city be like?’, should not be answered by reference to 
models, rules, prescriptions and so on, but through appropriate experimentation: ‘what we 
require are not solutions but problems’ (May, 2005: 172); critical thinking about situations, 
relations between elements and being open to what might happen if ….; what differences 
might emerge.
 This is a poststructuralist ontology which recognises both the importance of 
structures, systems and order, and also that of agency and power or force relations between 
agents and their mutual connections. Deleuze (2004a) emphasised the importance of 
praxis in the mutation of structures; of what ‘bodies’, in every sense of the word, can do. 
Bodies can be human, non-human animal, mineral or vegetable, but also social bodies, 
such as lobby groups, professional organisations and so on.
 Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is a spatial philosophy of the city and its 
modes of arranging or disposing persons and things (Rajchman, 1998: 3). As such, 
‘thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1994: 85). A framework inspired by Deleuze and Guattari may help us transform our 
traditionally rather static, axiomatic ways of understanding place, planning and gover-
nance. The authors offer a different understanding of space, spatialisation and movement 
which can raise some important questions to begin reconceptualisation of planning theory 
and practice. 
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 Besides being inherently spatial, (‘becomings belong to geography’, Deleuze 
and Parnet, 1987: 3) a Deleuzoguattarian frame is concerned with the processes through 
which existing forms of government (of self and others) are transformed. Patton (2000: 
3) identifies a constant theme of Deleuze’s work as being the conditions under which new 
institutions take shape, in which Deleuze avoids the Freudian/Lacanian trap of privileging 
the psychical over the social, and the Habermasian trap of privileging the social over the 
psychical. 
 Deleuze and Guattari also offer us a new empiricist constructivist conception 
of the relations between theory and practice. This is a conception which understands 
such relationships ‘in a partial and fragmentary manner, not as determinate relationships 
between “theory” understood as a totality and “practice” understood as an equally unified 
process of the application or implementation of theory’ (Patton, 2000: 5), but as a ‘system 
of relays within … a multiplicity of parts that are both theoretical and practical’ (Foucault, 
1977: 206). As Deleuze and Foucault (1977: 205-206) explain, ‘the relationship which holds 
in the application of a theory is never one of resemblance. … Practice is a set of relays from 
one theoretical path to another, and theory is a relay from one practice to another’.
 Deleuze and Guattari do not provide a catalogue of ready-made answers, which 
would simply block creative thought. Their ‘system of relays’ is rather a meshwork of 
potential enquiries which offer varying lines of inspiration (Bonta and Protevi, 2004). It is 
up to us to identify, analyse and intervene in the mixture of forces at work in the complex 
spaces of our cities, to speculate and to influence what may happen.
 Planners can never 100% guarantee what will take place, even if their plans are 
implemented as intended. Think, for example, of families living in poorly maintained 
high-rise residential blocks, or long culs-de-sac designed for resident safety from traffic 
but which reduce legibility and require long walks to transport stops or use of unappealing 
alleyways between lots. Planning is inherently experimental; so we should accept that.
 In presenting a selection of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts, I am aware of how 
much is not included and the relationships (links) between these ‘unsaid’ concepts and 
those discussed below. I am also aware that Deleuze and Guattari’s work is deliberately 
experimental, aimed at stimulating thought and practice, and that my attempts to set some 
of their ideas down in black and white in a linear format may unwittingly disconnect them 
from other concepts and reify what was never intended.
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI 1
 Inspired by Andrew Ballantyne’s (2007) brilliant example in Deleuze and Guattari 
for Architects of the hefted sheep who always follow habitual paths and the free-spirited 
sheep who experiment and take risks in their wanderings, I offer this collection of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s concepts to those involved in or intrigued by planning research or practice 
and who are interested in a challenge; in thinking differently and in extending the range of 
what planning may offer.
 I have chosen to ask ‘what can an assemblage do?’, what can space do?’ and ‘what 
can machines do?’ in the next three chapters as these are fundamental to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s work. Within each chapter I introduce some of the concepts which Deleuze and 
Guattari offer. The final two chapters address what Guattari termed ecosophy (ecophilo-
sophy) and (predominantly strategic) spatial planning respectively.
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CHAPTER 1
What can an assemblage do?
W hat has become known as ‘assemblage theory’, after DeLanda’s (2006) inter-pretation of Deleuze and Guattari, is now widely referenced and applied in the field of geography (see, for example, Anderson and McFarlane, 2011; McCann, 
2011; McFarlane, 2011a, 2011b; and the Dialogues in Human Geography discussion in 
2012 led by Anderson, Kearnes, McFarlane and Swanton). Whilst generally envisaged as 
a description of an object (such as a house, city, report, plan and so on), an assemblage 
in its Deleuzoguattarian sense implies ‘a way of thinking the social, political, economic, 
or cultural as a relational processuality of composition and as a methodology attuned to 
practice, materiality and emergence’ (McFarlane, 2011a: 652, emphasis added). Assemblage 
is concerned with assembling – processes of assembly; bringing heterogeneous elements 
into connection with others, separating elements and reconnecting them elsewhere and 
so on. Sometimes Deleuze and Guattari use the term ‘machinic assemblage’ (1987: 73) to 
emphasise that connections are made (machined).
 An assemblage as a thing comprises ‘heterogeneous elements that may be human 
and non-human, organic and inorganic, technical and natural’ (Anderson and McFarlane, 
2011: 124), structured by forms of power, including capital, gender, ethnicity and so on, 
but always exceeding those structures and performing differential capacities to become 
otherwise than anticipated (McFarlane, 2011: 667). Such a view accords with what Law and 
Mol (2001) term a topology of fluidity or fluid spatiality. I regard the author’s Zimbabwean 
bush pump assemblage as more-or-less analogous to a city in that, barring extreme circum-
stances, it generally retains its shape even though ‘from time to time bits, so to speak, fall 
off. New bits are patched on’ (2001: 614). Dynamic relationalities are reflected in differing 
styles and functions of every pump, yet, as Law and Mol (2001: 614) explain, changes occur 
in ways which allow the performance of continuity. Changes are gradual and adaptive to 
circumstances, affording the pump resilience in ‘a world in which invariance is likely to 
lead to rupture, …[i]n which the attempt to hold relations constant is likely to erode conti-
nuity. To lead to death’- or at least dysfunction.
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 Relations between elements are temporary, even if ‘temporary’ can be a very 
long time, as in changes to relations between geological strata due to folding and faulting 
activity. Assemblages do not have finality unless they cease to be. There is no predeter-
mined model or end-state to which assemblages aspire or evolve. Humans, for example, 
are the effects of genetic, social and historical assemblages (Colebrook, 2002: xx). We are 
all different. As are cities, which are the effects of social, cultural, environmental, political, 
often military and colonial assemblages. The collection of elements and the relations 
between them in an assemblage, such as a body or a city, expresses its identity: David 
Beckham, Princess Mary, Vienna, Ystad and so on. (See Fig. 1.1) It should be noted in 
addition that the elements which constitute an assemblage also include its qualities (stylish, 
multicultural, quaint etc) and its effectivity, what it can do (pass balls accurately, ski, 
present music, attract tourists …). 
 In this perspective, assemblages are actualised by a multiplicity of relations 
between elements which have no significance alone. Relations, therefore, have localised 
motives, not predetermined models. Roffe (2006: np) offers the example of a tree in 
autumn: ‘A flash of red, a movement, a gust of wind, these elements must be externally 
related to each other to create the sensation of a tree in autumn’. Here we can see that there 
is no predetermined model of a tree; only an immanent and contingent world of relations 
Fig. 1.1 Cat Assemblage
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– wind, leaves, colour – from which the tree in autumn emerges through the exterior 
relations of its elements. Exterior related elements retain some degree of autonomy from 
the assemblage in which they participate. So it is possible that one such element (eg the 
colour red) may be detached from a set of relations in one assemblage (the autumn tree) 
and inserted into a different set of relations with entirely different elements in another 
assemblage (eg a British post box). Similarly, David Beckham changes football clubs and 
joins assemblages of different players.  Or, another person might be a local planning officer, 
a part-time university student, a football player on Sunday afternoons and a daughter. She 
connects differently into the four assemblages above whilst being the same person. (See 
Van Wezemael, 2009 for more detail on exterior relations of elements.)
 It is the capacity for elements to connect outside of their assemblages into other 
assemblages which highlights the temporary and partial nature of relations, connections 
(Greenhough, 2012: 203) and of assemblages. It also highlights the role of the aleatory 
(unpredictability, randomness or chance). For instance, there are now over 43 medicinal 
drugs which may result in potentially fatal side effects if they connect with grapefruit juice 
(Mann, 2012). Pharmaceutical companies test their products on assemblages representing 
a range of human digestive systems. But the chance entry of grapefruit into the drug-body 
assemblage can block enzymes which should break down the medication, leaving it highly 
concentrated and potentially toxic. 
 In this instance the grapefruit acts as a catalyst (Deleuze, 1989: 213) which 
disrupts what pharmacists assumed would be linear causality (patient takes drug [cause] 
> patient becomes more healthy [effect]). We see that the same cause can produce very 
different effects depending on the assemblage which it joins. The potential for medication 
to work differently in different people illustrates the significance of both the exteriority 
(medication introduced into different body assemblages) and the interiority (medication 
in relationship with enzymes etc within a particular body assemblage) of relations.
 Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 503-505) define the concept of assemblage along two 
axes. One axis defines the roles which components or elements may play, from the purely 
material to the purely expressive. Material components include elements such as bodies 
(David Beckham, Princess Mary and so on), buildings (in Vienna, Ystad), technology 
(footballs, computers, lifts), laws, reports, minutes of meetings etc etc. Material elements 
in a social assemblage, such as a lobby or pressure group, also include the time and energy 
expended, for instance, in maintaining the assemblage’s relations, negotiating agendas, 
hiding struggles from public view (Hillier and Van Wezemael, 2008). Each of the material 
elements can be enforced/stabilised or challenged/destabilised, by, in the example above, 
a key person leaving the group, someone leaking information on disagreements to the 
media etc. Expressive components include language (such as, written decision notices or 
petitions; spoken, pictorial, genetic code and so on) and non-linguistic visibilities such 
as gestures and charisma. Each of these elements can also be enforced and/or challenged. 
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Deleuze (1988a) suggests that relations of power can be traced on the material/expressive 
axis where one can also identify subjectifications (how actors regard and treat other 
humans and non-humans, such as NIMBY residents, skilful opponent, greedy developer, 
derelict land, weed or pest) and subjectivisations (how actors regard and treat themselves, 
such as knowledgeable expert, ‘yes-person’). 
 The second axis concerns the stabilisation/destabilisation or territorialisation/
deterritorialisation of assemblages. I will write more about territorialisation in the Chapter 
3, but simply state here that stabilisation, or territorialisation, acts to sharpen borders, 
homogenise components and so on. Deterritorialisation, or destabilisation, acts to free 
up fixed relations (see Hillier and Van Wezemael, 2008). An assemblage is thus both ‘the 
provisional holding together of a group of entities across differences and a continuous 
process of movement and transformation as relations and terms change’ (Anderson et al, 
2012: 177).
 Territories are more than spaces, however. Territories express or claim something 
(my share of the pitch, my palace, my story) as well as occupying space. But we can see 
from these examples that assemblages and territories are contingent. They are constantly 
changing – Beckham changes football clubs and plays in different positions, Princess Mary 
changes clothes and venues, Vienna and Ystad change with regard to populations, seasonal 
bird migrations, residential and other developments.
 Deleuze and Guattari use the term ‘territory’ in a metaphorical sense to depict 
sites of political engagement, their lines of power, practices and institutions (O’Neill and 
McGuirk, 2005: 285). Territorialisation is a form of action on, or capture of, individual or 
social forces which seeks to limit or constrain their possibilities for action. It involves ‘the 
creation of meaning in social space through the forging of coded connections and distinc-
tions’ (Brown and Lunt, 2002: 17) into some form of uniformity or consistency, such as 
regulations, land use development plans and so on. 
 An assemblage can have components working to stabilise or territorialise and 
code it at the same time as other components work in the opposite direction. The axis of 
territorialisation is concerned with process.
 John Phillips (2006) points out that the traditional translation of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s term agencement by the English term ‘assemblage’ is ‘not a good approximation’ 
(Phillips, 2006: 108). As Phillips indicates, there is a world of difference between the terms. 
Deleuze and Guattari only rarely use the French term assemblage, for which ‘assem-
blage’ would be the literal translation. Assemblage would be used to refer to, for example, 
disparate elements which are assembled together (such as a loose network of neighbours 
and a city council). Deleuze and Guattari tend to use the French words ensemble or associ-
ation rather than assemblage to indicate non-directional groups of actors. (See Fig. 1.2)
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 This is an assemblage of elements which are all foodstuffs which I have in my 
kitchen. But I would not cook or assemble pet food, bircher meusli and garlic etc into one 
dish to satisfy my hunger. This assemblage is non-directional.
 The term agencement implies agency and strategy. Deleuze (1988b [1970]) 
appears to have developed the notion of agencement from his work on Spinoza’s idea of the 
common notion; the ‘having in common’ becoming a ‘third body’ in an event. Agencement 
thus implies an agency and immanence which assemblage does not. (See Fig. 1.3.)
 This is an assemblage of organic foodstuffs from my kitchen which can form an 
agencement. Folded together and encountering heat each element is transformed during 
the cooking (machining) process, changing their relationships forever: becoming-cake. 
The cake can perform agency to satisfy my hunger and perhaps stimulate affects and joyful 
sensation. However, I cannot pre-organise a perfect cake that looks exactly like the recipe 
book image as my cake-event is generated uniquely at the moment of interaction of heat, 
my folding technique, the ingredients, the cake-tin, the oven-timer etc etc. The cake could 
burn or be soggy, or it could be edible. Whichever, it will never be the cake in the recipe 
picture.
Fig. 1.2 A Food Assemblage
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 An agencement, therefore, is more than simply an assemblage. It is a process of 
‘agencing’ (Bogue, 2007: 145-146) – an active bringing-into-existence of its own agency. In 
the concept of agencement the constituent elements intersect, fold together and transform 
themselves and each other (such as ratepayers living in a ‘neighbourhood’ with a clear 
sense of themselves as a political actor when local politicians propose changes in neigh-
bourhood policing). 
 In asking ‘what makes an assemblage into an agencement’, one would criti-
cally investigate the relations between the entities or elements in the collective. What is 
important are the relations between the elements, rather than the elements themselves: ‘in 
a multiplicity, what counts are not the terms or the elements, but what there is “between”’ 
(Deleuze and Parnet, 1987: viii).
One of the key aspects of an assemblage or an agencement, then, is what Deleuze terms 
‘a logic of AND’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 25); a ‘geography of relations’ (Deleuze and 
Parnet, 1987: 70). One element is not hierarchically absorbed by another but exists in 
connective alliance with it. A logic of ‘and’ is a relational co-existence rather than a binary 
either/or. The assemblage of Princess Mary comprises flesh and blood and gown and tiara 
…. Vienna comprises streets and shops and houses and music and … and … and. 
Fig. 1.3 A Potential Food Agencement
PH
O
TO
: J
EA
N
 H
IL
LI
ER
0AESOP        YOUNG ACADEMIC NETWORK
 Deleuze’s stammering ‘and, and, and’ is relational. Relations imply social 
practices. They come into being via practice. Contingent ‘circumstances, actions, and 
passions’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 56) provide for the specific forms of relations between 
different human and non-human entities. Relations are not derived from the entities 
themselves, but are rather endowed with a positive reality.
 Relations are thus ‘effects of the activities and practices of individuals who are 
different yet nevertheless interacting’ (Hayden, 1995: 286). Relations as practices inevi-
tably involve plays of power and politics. Following Foucault’s (1980) notion of power as 
a capillary process, Deleuze suggests that power works on and through subjects via the 
relations produced within the various contexts. 
 Relational assemblages of elements are inherently unstable and fluid. Assemblage 
boundaries are indeterminate and frequently challenged, transgressed and/or extended 
as new connections occur and old ones rupture. ‘Neither boundaries nor relations mark 
the difference between one place and another. Instead, sometimes boundaries come and 
go, allow leakage or disappear altogether, while relations transform themselves without 
fracture. Sometimes, then, social space behaves like a fluid’ (Mol and Law, 1994: 643, cited 
in Urry, 2003: 41).
 As Ballantyne (2005: 239) eloquently demonstrates, the design of buildings is 
‘an art of relations’. As he explains, in this example relations include those between people 
‘as they are brought together and kept apart by walls and spaces, relations of crowds and 
stones and timbers as they co-operate in holding together as assembl[age] of many parts 
that we perceive as some kind of unity, contractual relations as the flow of money and 
labour makes this assembl[age]’ and so on.
 Such ideas also find resonance in Patsy Healey’s work in the planning field and 
her interest ‘in the way the dynamic fluidity of evolving relational webs intersects with 
the “fixes” that develop as certain ways of thinking and doing become consolidated into 
accepted practices’ (Healey, 2007: 15). A relational awareness in planning practice would 
recognise the diversity of assemblages relevant to the issue under consideration, each with 
its own force relations, ‘nodal points and flows, and spatial patterning’ (Healey, 2007: 29). 
 But as Ruddick (2012: 208) points out, planners need to avoid envisioning 
relationality between things as pre-constituted objects. Human and non-human ‘objects’, 
as assemblages, are contingent, even if over a very long time-frame. The popularity of 
‘relationality’ risks turning it into an empty signifier, simply looking at something/someone 
in relation to something/someone else, rather than delving below the surface to examine 
relational interiority and exteriority. In other words, it is not simply the relations between 
elements within an assemblage, or across assemblages, that should be considered, but the 
ways in which the relations engage the elements themselves (Ruddick, 2012).
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 A space of flows is a space of lines rather than a space of points. Points lie on the 
intersection of lines. If planners are to understand what is happening in the geographical 
areas in which they work and research, they need to follow and disentangle lines which are 
in constant flux, bifurcating and changing dimensions.
 Deleuze and Guattari (1987) distinguish between two different forms of line 
which define the possibility of elements within and in relation to assemblages and systems. 
The first are broad molar lines of rigid segmentarity (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 195 and 
210–211). Molar lines position elements within organised, hierarchised and stratified 
spaces (eg lifecycle stages – birth, school, jobs, retirement, death). The line is rigid because 
it is imposed as the defining line of the assemblage. A linear line, it must be followed 
(Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 106). The second lines are molecular lines of supple segmentation 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 196 and 210-211), along which occur processes of desire, 
affective attachments to friends, pets etc. They are variable, but only within the parameters 
of the system. The two forms of line are closely entangled: ‘every society, but also every 
individual, is, therefore, composed of both segmentarities at once’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987: 260).
 Deleuze and Guattari also identify a third form of line: the line of flight. This is a 
crack or rupture of the other lines and a flight from what has been. It is a vector of escape 
towards a destination which is unknown. It marks a threshold of lowered resistance to 
something (‘you can no longer stand what you put up with before’, Deleuze and Parnet, 
2002: 126), a change in desire or the intensity of desire, a new anxiety and so on. For an 
individual, it could be a change in profession or a divorce. It could be a group of people 
forming a new political party or planning practitioners conceiving a new form of adaptive 
strategic spatial planning. Lines of flight may be born out of resistance, but they can be 
positively creative. ‘It’s along this line of flight that things come to pass, becomings evolve, 
revolutions take shape’ (Deleuze, 1995: 45).
 Deleuze and Guattari (1987) utilise the metaphor of a rhizome to signify 
connection. A rhizome is a plant, such as ginger, potato tubers, ferns and some iris species, 
which can send out new roots and shoots at any point, forming a network. (Fig. 1.4)
 Deleuze and Guattari contrast a rhizome with a tree where branches and twigs 
are hierarchically organised from the central trunk. A rhizome describes ‘the connections 
that occur between the most disparate and the most similar of objects, places and people; 
the strange chains of events that link people’ (Colman, 2010: 232). A rhizome is thus a 
‘map’ of networked, relational and transversal processes. Rhizomes are in constant, though 
often slow, transformation as relations change through new encounters or ruptures and 
the course of lines is altered. The world wide web and social media are good examples 
of rhizomes which allow non-hierarchical, international connections almost anywhere, 
between almost everyone with electronic or wi-fi access.
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 Livesey (2010) demonstrates how the concept of the rhizome has application 
to urban planning, suggesting that it can be used to examine interconnections between 
buildings and spaces and the structure of cities (2010: 235). Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 
15) describe Amsterdam as a ‘rhizome-city’, but the term could apply to many others. 
A ‘rhizome-city’ implies that points (eg locations or buildings) are connected to an 
infinitude of other points, as in, for instance Doreen Massey’s (2007) case study of London. 
Connectivity and movement (mobilities) are important for humans and non-humans 
including information, finance and other commodities. (See also Graham and Marvin, 
2001, for good examples of urban connectivity and non-connectivity.)
 So, what can an assemblage do?
 An assemblage arranges or fits heterogeneous elements together relationally into 
an identifiable entity. Assemblages claim territories, such as individual homes, neighbour-
hoods, towns and cities. They express a range of meanings. Assemblages as agencements 
work through flows of agency which can transform behaviour and shape space. Think, for 
example, of the cellphone/body assemblage, where the phone rings, is answered and the 
body changes direction and purpose on being asked to collect some groceries. 
Fig. 1.4 Ginger Rhizome
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 Since assemblages emerge through the exterior relations of their elements, 
they can explain movement, change, space and so on in terms of the alignments and 
realignments of relations between elements rather than in terms of some pre-assumed 
identities, intentions or interiorities of the wills of individuals or groups (Grosz, 2001: 92). 
We need to remember, however, that although assemblages are composed of relations, they 
are not reducible to them (see Buchanan, 2000). Assemblages have their own speeds and 
slownesses; their own vitality.
 Anderson et al (2012: 173) suggest that ‘thinking with assemblages’ offers an 
openness about spatial form that follows from an experimental stance that is attentive 
to how provisional orderings cohere in the midst of, and through, ontologically diverse 
actants’. To which I would add, not only how provisional orderings may cohere, but how 
they change, rupture and fragment. Thinking assemblages means thinking relations, 
agency and process rather than end-product. This is important for spatial planning as 
I discuss in Chapter 6.
GA: As you note in your text, Deleuze’s concepts are not intended as fixed points
of reference, but experiments: solutions to specific problems arising through this 
experimentation. Therefore, it seems that Deleuze would welcome, and indeed 
may have insisted, that we approach his concepts in a pragmatic way: by re-
creating them to resolve specific problems identified within a specific field. This is 
an important point for us because Deleuze does not offer us solutions to the kinds 
of problems we find in planning. My question, therefore, is how do we go about 
re-creating Deleuze’s concepts to suit planning problems? And, how far can we 
push these concepts before they cross a ‘threshold’ and become something else: 
something that is no longer ‘Deleuzean’?
JH: What kinds of problems are you thinking of?
GA: I think your question back to me, ‘what kinds of problem?’ goes straight to
the heart of this question. I think there are probably two groups of problems here. 
And we may argue that there are overlaps between them: the problems for which 
Deleuze created the concepts and the problems for which we, as planners, make 
these concepts useful.
In the former, I believe Deleuze creates concepts as solutions to ontological 
problems that arise as he sets out his philosophical project. Thus, ‘the assemblage’ 
is a solution to the ontological problem of essences (DeLanda, 00). But this 
problem/ solution is approached in a more-or-less abstract way. 
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Planning problems, we might argue, usually arise from (or perhaps underpin) the 
making or assessing of a plan / proposal. Therefore, the problems are much more 
practical in nature.
Typical questions facing typical planners might include: ‘do we need more housing? 
Where do we put housing, how many, what should they look like and designed for 
whom? What other problems does this create? What other facilities or solutions 
must be considered, where do they go and what knock on affects does this have? 
How do we respond to that? Which of the three brick samples proposed by the 
developer do we approve?’
For planners the question might be – how do we translate Deleuze’s ontological 
solutions into practical solutions to these kinds of practice-based questions?
JH: You say that Deleuze does not offer us solutions to the kinds of problems
we find in planning. Well, firstly, I don’t think that there can ever be ‘solutions’ in 
planning as such. There is always the virtual, as I demonstrate using Ballantyne’s 
box in Chapter . Whatever we decide to do, we could always have done something 
else. In addition, nothing is ever completely ‘solved’. If we ‘solve’ a problem of 
traffic congestion by constructing an urban toll motorway from A to B, then some 
people will be able to drive from A to B more quickly. But others will refuse to 
pay the toll and will find rat-runs through residential streets. In addition, the local 
community through which the new tollway has been built may be severed by the 
road and also have to endure massively increased levels of noise and pollution. 
Loss of property value is also inevitable. Wildlife and pets will be affected too as 
they will be forced to change their movement patterns or risk being run over.
Moreover, I would argue that Deleuze does not offer solutions to anything and would 
not want to do so. Deleuze problematised the problem-solution relation, turning it 
on its Platonic head. When spatial planners think about ‘problems’, they tend to 
think in terms of ‘solutions’. ‘It is though a problem were merely a particular lack or 
fault that a solution will fill or rectify’ (May, 00: ). A solution makes problems 
disappear! Practitioners and politicians may fall into the trap of allowing a solution 
to define a problem. For instance, we can control farmers burning stubble near 
motorways on days when hot air presses down on cooler air nearer the ground 
(a temperature inversion), but we cannot – or do not want to – control car usage. 
Motorway smog thus becomes a problem of farming rather than of driving. Or, there 
is lottery money available to build a sports arena but not a school. So the problem 
becomes a shortage of sports facilities.
As Deleuze notes, however: ‘far from disappearing in this overlay, however, [the 
problem] insists and persists in these solutions’ (1: 1). Perhaps instead of 
regarding problems as something to be definitively ‘solved’, planners could regard 
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them as opening up areas for discussion and negotiation of different possibilities, 
recognising that every possibility will capture something, but not everything, of 
the problem, and thinking through what it renders present and absent. It is also 
important to recognise the implications, advantages and disadvantages (Strengths, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats, SWOT) of each possibility for different 
socio-economic groups, for non-humans and so on. 
We must be careful not to allow the solution to define the problem (what we think 
that politicians or the public want; what there is lottery funding for; what ‘best 
practice’ tells us to do and so on). Solutions are actual – real, stable identities, 
whereas problems are virtual – inexhaustible ‘open fields’ (May, 00). We thus 
tend to see solutions in terms of their actuality rather than their virtuality. In other 
words, we let the solution determine how we see or frame the problem. We may, 
therefore, ignore many potentialities, opting for a particular version which is already 
constrained by an overdetermined structure that we have imposed. 
As Deleuze (1: 1, 1, in Williams, 00: 1) wrote, ‘the problem is at once 
transcendent and immanent in relation to its solutions. Transcendent, because 
it consists in a system of ideal liaisons or differential relations between generic 
elements. Immanent because these liaisons or relations are incarnated in the actual 
relations which do not resemble them and are defined by the field of solutions’.
Deleuze referenced non-linear mathematics and differential calculations to demon-
strate how problems are multiplicities of singularities; fields of vectors which point 
towards different trajectories. But the mathematical equations cannot tell in advance 
which trajectory will be actualised. DeLanda (010) develops these ideas further to 
demonstrate how problems are independent of their solutions, and Kang Cao and 
Yan Zhang (01) explore Riemannian differential geometry and planning in a paper 
in Planning Theory.  This is definitely not my field, but I think what is important for 
planners is that we should not subordinate problems to solutions. Doing so focuses 
efforts on ‘final products’ or solutions instead of on the processes involved in terms 
of how the ‘problem’ is defined.
I know that you have not used the word as such in your question, but for me, 
problematising problems and solutions leads onto problematising judgment, 
something which planners are constantly required to exercise.
I think that Daniel W. Smith’s (00, 01) reading of Deleuze’s work on judgment 
is really useful. Following Deleuze (1), Smith explains how the simplest form 
of judgment is that of attribution. For example, the park is beautiful. A property 
(beauty) is attributed to a thing or subject (the park). But what interests Deleuze is 
the judgment of relation. For instance, Regent’s Park in London is larger than Green 
Park. This statement does not attribute a property to a subject, because if we say 
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that ‘being larger than’ is a property of Regent’s Park, we also need to say, at the 
same time, that ‘being smaller than’ is also a property of Regent’s Park since it 
is smaller than, for instance, Richmond Park. ‘Larger than’ and ‘smaller than’ are 
relations, not properties, and as Deleuze shows us, relations are external to their 
terms. A relation may unite the terms, but is not reducible to them. Large and small 
are properties, on the other hand, which are internal to their terms.
Relations can change. Although it is extremely unlikely, the Royal Parks Agency 
may decide to subdivide Richmond Park, making it smaller than Regent’s Park. 
As Deleuze (1: np) stated, ‘Once you discover the world of relations, you can 
ask if every judgment is not a judgment of relation’.
Deleuze also distinguishes between the power of judgment and the power of 
immanent evaluation. He gives the example, in one of his lectures, of Orson Welles’ 
movie ‘F for Fake’, in which a forger of Vermeer’s works of art was able to pass off 
the forgeries as real Vermeers. Deleuze (1) explains that the forger managed to 
convince the experts by studying and making use of the criteria which the experts 
had established as constituting a Vermeer. The experts judge the forged painting 
according to their criteria and decide, ‘These are genuine Vermeers, they meet all 
the criteria’ (Deleuze, 1, my translation). Deleuze argues that the mistake which 
experts commit is to not recognise that what makes Vermeer a great artist is that 
he is able to transform creatively: he metamorphoses. ‘A genuine Vermeer has the 
power (puissance) of metamorphosis’ (Deleuze, 1, my translation). The forger 
simply paints according to some static template of criteria, while the expert simply 
judges the creations of others according to this static template, unable to change or 
to comprehend metamorphosis. For Deleuze, critique and creation are immanent. 
“[It] is not a matter of judging … in the name of a higher authority, which would be 
the good, the true; it is a matter, on the contrary, of evaluating every being, every 
action and passion, even every value, in relation to the life which they involve. .. 
[I]mmanent evaluation, instead of judgment as transcendent value . . . .” (Deleuze, 
1: 11).
Perhaps the closest example in planning/architecture to this would be judgment of 
architectural buildings in competitions by what they look like when new, or even 
off-the-plan, compared with by post-occupancy evaluation of how they perform. 
Also, Hutton’s Transport Plan and Policy for Kosovo (see Hillier, 00: 0-0) 
embraces a philosophy of specification of planning objectives in terms of perfor-
mance rather than physical manifestations. The key paragraph on page 1 of the 
Plan states that ‘The Plan also recognises that economic and urban geography are 
volatile: the size and nature of urban development is always changing, producing 
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ever-shifting patterns of demand for transport’ (MTC, 00: 1, in Hillier, 00: 0). 
The basic ideas underlying the plan include abandoning the notion of an end-
state. Many transport plans, like other strategic spatial plans, are created through 
a linear process moving from a survey of the current situation and identification of 
‘problems’, to the design of an idealised ‘end state’ to ‘solve’ the problems and 
definition of a list of projects which will achieve that end state. Such plans, premised 
on stability, tend to fail for economic, social, technical and political reasons. 
Performativity was thus considered far more relevant for the Kosovo Plan than was 
output measurement.
The point which Deleuze is trying to make with his Vermeer example is to demon-
strate the power of the false and to argue against making transcendent judgements 
of true and false, good and evil. Deleuze, then, is not talking about the kind of 
everyday judgments which development assessment planners make – does the 
development application comply with the guidelines? – but about morality and 
ethics.
For Deleuze, morality always implies ‘something superior to Being which plays 
the role of the Good’ (Deleuze, 10: np), against which humans and non-humans 
are judged. Deleuze prefers ethics to morals because he argues that there is no 
judgment, as such, in ethics. Instead of relating a human or non-human to a set of 
transcendent values, Deleuze would relate them to the mode of existence that they 
imply. In other words, ethics is concerned with what a human or non-human can 
do, rather than with what they are. While morality looks at what ‘is’ and then claims 
‘what ought to be’, ethics is concerned with creativity and potentiality.
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CHAPTER 2
What can space do?
F or Deleuze and Guattari, space is ‘the locus of interaction of dynamic forces of material systems’ (Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 17). Space is a multiplicity of elements which brings together characteristics of simultaneity, contiguity or juxtaposition 
and qualitative and quantitative differentiations (Grosz, 2001: 113). As Grosz (2001: 114) 
describes, ‘space is discontinuous, infinitely divisible, static and always actual. Space in 
short is the milieu of things, matter, identities, substances, entities that are real, comparable 
and calculable’. 
 
 Planners and architects have traditionally regarded space as a passive Euclidian 
container, ‘out there’, in which objects can be placed or located. In this view, space precedes 
the objects. As Deleuze (1991) suggests, however, space is produced through matter. 
Assemblages and individual bodies are constituted along with the space they occupy. Space 
is active, changing with time, open to change and transformation. 
 
 Although A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) is a geophilo-
sophical project, full of spatial metaphors, there is little discussion of physical space 
itself. In fact, for Deleuze and Guattari, space is not necessarily (or even very often) a 
geographical entity. Whilst buildings and streets may represent physical spaces of planned 
neighbourhood ‘community’, they have no tangible connections to people’s spaces of 
lived experience. Deleuze tends to consider space as narrative space of cinema; space as 
discursive and in constant movement. 
 
 Deleuze and Guattari describe space according to its degree of smoothness and 
striation. Elsewhere (Hillier, 2007: 63-65) I explain that smooth and striated spaces can 
be physical (as in cities), or mental (psychological). Smooth space is seemingly undiffe-
rentiated space (eg felt cloth), in contrast to striated space (woven cloth) which is regular, 
ordered and closed. Smooth space may be regarded as composed chaos; a ‘complex web of 
divisions, bifurcations, knots and confluences’ (Serres, 2000: 51). In striated space, relation-
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ships are linear cause and effect and the observer has a god’s-eye view, able to see the order 
of things by deterministic laws. Smooth space consists of points as relays between lines; 
striated space consists of lines between points (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 480-481). Fig. 
2.1 summarises the various qualities of smooth and striated space. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Striated space is fixed. It ‘bounds, structures, frames and locates action; and 
practices of discipline, regulation, subjection take place inside these spaces’ (Osborne 
and Rose, 2004: 218). Moreover, time is detached from space. Yet, as Osborne and Rose 
indicate, striated space always fails – it is lacking. There is a constitutive outside or lack: 
people rebel, plans go awry, things change. ‘Striated spatialisation, precisely because it 
aspires to a certain rigour or rigidity, is vulnerable to forces that would turn its lines into 
points, open up its intervals, redistribute its surfaces’ (Osborne and Rose, 2004: 218).  
 
 Striated space tends to be associated with the State: ‘one of the fundamental 
tasks of the State is to striate the space’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 479) (eg, through 
local zoning schemes, land use classes and so on), whilst smooth space is created by war 
machines (see Chapter 4) along lines of flight (eg anti-wind farm lobbies, civil liberties 
Fig. 2.1 Qualities of Smooth and Striated Space 
ADAPTED FROM HILLIER (2007: 64) 
Smooth Space 
felt: entanglement
infinite, open and unlimited 
continuous variation 
space of movement 
space of war machine 
‘barbarian’ 
multiple perspective 
close-range/micro-vision 
points of reference immanent 
abstract line: wandering, irregular 
line without beginning or end 
matter variable 
smooth space of Go 
thought space  
constantly transversed into striated space 
Striated Space 
woven space: warp and woof 
fixed, limited 
back and forth 
sedentary space 
space instituted by state apparatus 
imperial 
central perspective 
long-distance/macro-vision 
points of reference transcendent 
concrete line: bounded, constant, regular 
line of fixed orientation 
matter gridded and organised 
striated space of Chess 
ideology 
constantly reversed into smooth space 
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organisations). Both spaces, nevertheless, cannot be completely actualised, opening up 
opportunities for the counter form of space.  
 
 Smooth and striated space should not be regarded as mutually exclusive, but 
rather ‘intermixtures which constantly make use of elements of each other’ (Osborne and 
Rose, 2004: 211). Forces at work within space are constantly attempting to striate it whilst 
in the course of striation other forces are smoothing. The two exist in complex, mixed 
forms in agonistic relation which Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 481) exemplify through the 
sea and the city as smooth and striated spaces par excellence: ‘the sea is a smooth space 
fundamentally open to striation, and the city, is the force of striation that reimparts 
smooth space’. 
 I demonstrate striation of the sea and beach through the example of Antony 
Gormley’s installation Another Place on Crosby Beach, Liverpool, England. (Fig. 2.2) 
 
 The smooth spaces of the sea and the beach and the random placing of 100 cast 
iron statues of Gormley’s naked body were striated by requirements to comply with the 
1949 Coast Protection Act, the 1985 Food and Environmental Protection Act and with 
Fig. 2.2 Antony Gormley’s Another Place, Crosby Beach, Liverpool 
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national Planning Policy Statements, Regional Spatial Strategies, Local Development 
Frameworks and 1994 Habitat Assessment regulations. After two years of heated debate 
the iron men, the beach, human visitors, fishers, jet skiers, sailors, dogs, and the sea were 
acceptably striated for all permissions to be granted. Several iron men were relocated to 
afford easier passage for the coastguard lifeboat, a by-law requires dogs to remain on-lead, 
signage and ranger patrols warn human visitors and fishers and permanent flashing buoys 
mark safe channels at sea for sailing craft (see Hillier, 2011a for detail).  
 
But, can one striate the birds? (Fig. 2.3). 
 
 
 
 Fig. 2.3 Birds at Another Place, Crosby Beach, Liverpool 
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 Smooth spaces arising from the city for Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 481) include 
shanty towns, or one might add, perhaps, activities of guerrilla gardening or squatting, 
though in many ways these activities endure where permitted/striated. Ecological reter-
ritorialisation of ‘derelict’ or brownfield land or social media discussion could also illustrate 
smoothing of urban space. 
 
 Whilst smooth space is the fluid space of flight and becoming, and striated space 
is controlled, the former should not necessarily be regarded as positive and the latter 
negative. Lines of flight can turn out to be negative in their impacts, such as the Taliban for 
women’s employment and social opportunities in Afghanistan. 
 
Striation is a form of territorialisation. As I stated in Chapter 2, territorialisation describes 
‘the creation of meaning in social space through the forging of coded connections and 
distinctions’ (Brown and Lunt, 2002: 17) into some form of uniformity or consistency, 
such as laws, symbols, slogans or concepts (such as performance measures). For instance, 
English local authority planning departments are territorialised by the Department of 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG) so that the desires and behaviours of local 
planners align with those of central government. Whilst all humans and institutions 
territorialise, it is a principal function of the state (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 310-350). 
The act of governance requires the stabilisation and fixing of certain forms of social inter-
action in order to maintain ‘social harmony’. Similar to the Foucauldian concept of govern-
mentality, Deleuze and Guattari describe state territorialisation as a form of action, or 
capture, on individual or social forces which seeks to limit or constrain their possibilities 
for action (Patton, 2000: 104) (eg anti-social behaviour legislation).  
 As mentioned above, however, individuals and groups may decide to leave a 
territorial assemblage following physical or psychological lines of flight, shedding the 
system by which they had been previously controlled. Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 508) 
refer to this as deterritorialisation: the destabilisation and ultimate removal of codings that 
confer fixed meaning. Absolute deterritorialisation would resemble an anarchic revolution. 
However, as Deleuze and Guattari (1994) indicate, deterritorialisation does not take place 
without some form of reterritorialisation; the establishment of new rules and ideologies. 
As Ian Buchanan points out, ‘it is the sad fate of successful anarchists to impose anarchy 
as a form of government and so undo everything they’d worked for at the moment of its 
achievement’ (2000: 119). 
 
 Deterritorialisation, and especially reterritorialisation, are usually associated 
with power imbalances. Sutton and Martin-Jones (2008) offer the example of colonialism 
to illustrate this point. Through colonialisation, in the Americas, Africa, the Middle East, 
India, East Asia, Australia, New Zealand and so on, dominant European cultures were 
imposed more or less successfully on ‘conquered’ lands. Processes by which Indigenous 
peoples and their lands were deterritorialised and reterritorialised included war, massacre, 
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genocide, slavery, taxes, land clearances, reservations, diseases and other forms of violent 
abuse (Sutton and Martin-Jones, 2008: 7) together with less physically violent colonisation 
such as 20th and 21st Century Americanised consumerism in which former striations are 
displaced by new modes of ordering. 
 
 Power is quite a difficult concept to unravel in Deleuze and Guattari’s work. 
In fact, Deleuze engaged in strong debates with his good friend, Michel Foucault, about 
power. Deleuze and Guattari prefer to examine the role of desire rather than power as 
such, because they regard desire as creating relations through which power might actualise 
and operate. In this, Deleuze takes a Nietzschean approach in terms of potential powers 
or forces which are actualised in their relation with other powers. Power, or force, then, is 
not a thing to be ‘owned’, wielded or managed, but rather a process of actualisation. While 
many commentators concentrate on the differences in understandings of power between 
Deleuze and Foucault, Paul Patton, a student of both, points to the convergence between 
their ideas of power as a productive, differentiated, heterogeneous, variable process which 
can be either positive or negative in its impact (Patton, 2000: 73-77).  
 
 Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 106) make a crucial distinction between power in 
French as pouvoir – instituted power of domination or coercive power – and puissance – 
the capacity to form emergent unities which respect the heterogeneity of their components, 
immanent forces/capacities of becoming, power to act rather than to dominate another. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, desire exemplifies puissance, as does the assemblage of wasp 
and orchid which becomes a symbiotic, emergent unity (see chapter 4). 
 
 Elsewhere (Hillier, 2007, Chapter 5), I illustrate the power of pouvoir in relation 
to the construction of the bridge at Hindmarsh Island in South Australia, which the 
Indigenous Aboriginal people call Kumarangk. The story tells of the privileging of colonial, 
rational, documented, adversarial systems of spatial planning-related law, which permitted 
construction of the bridge, over Indigenous oral, spiritual knowledges about sacred sites 
and how the power of Deleuzoguattarian pouvoir (institutional domination) restricted the 
potential for puissance of the local Ngarrindjeri women to respect their heritage.  
 
For Deleuze, law is not so much a noun, as a desiring-machine process which creates 
relations through which power actualises and operates, as in the Kumarangk case. ‘Where 
one believed there was the law, there is in fact desire and desire alone’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987: 49). Law was created by non-Indigenous Australians and then interpreted 
reactively by the South Australian government, the Federal Court, a Royal Commission 
and various Inquiries. In so doing, Ngarrindjerri women’s Indigenous law was captured, 
de- and re-territorialised. It was unable to become a line of flight, resisting and trans-
gressing State law, as it was thwarted by the powerful blockages of pouvoir. 
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 So, what can space do? 
 As Claire Colebrook (2004: §5) suggests, we can and should move beyond consti-
tuted space and systems to the thought of spatiality in which ‘space will differ within itself 
according to the lives that occupy it’. Space is the effect of relations: ‘our space is constituted 
by the sense we make of it’ (Colebrook, 2004: §8). Spatiality, then, is an opening of the 
virtual; the potential to create the new. Deleuze distinguishes between space as gridded, 
coded or striated by laws and other agents and smooth space as a plane of singular affects 
and events. Yet he stresses the importance of both. We need ‘just a little order to protect us 
from chaos’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 201). 
 
 
GA: I would like to talk about the relationship between the State assemblage and
striated spaces. As you note in your text, this link is made in Deleuze’s seminal 
texts and has been picked up by a number of Deleuzean scholars, forming a strong 
influence in Bonta and Protevi’s ‘geophilosophy’ for example (Bonta and Protevi, 
00).  But, I would like us to consider how viable and useful this relationship is and 
what it might mean for current or future planning professional many of which will 
work for, or go onto work for local governments. 
 The first question I would like to ask concerns the State assemblage and its 
striated space (singular). Do you think we can usefully talk about a coherent State 
assemblage, or is it better to think of the state as an assemblage of assemblages, 
each assemblage striating space in different ways? Otherwise, how do we explain 
why one State assemblage striates space into roads and railways lines, another 
into buildings and areas of historic interest, whilst another into key environmental 
features and flooding zones? 
 
JH: Deleuze and Guattari regard the ‘State’ as ‘state-form’ – a process of 
institutionalised overcoding or territorialisation – rather than a noun. We are used to 
thinking of nation states with (temporarily) fixed geographical territorial boundaries. 
But Deleuze is more interested in what state-forms can do than what they are. For 
Deleuze and Guattari, states are ‘isomorphic’. They may share basic structure and 
function, but since they are heterogeneous, they differ in how they express these. 
For example, some states recognise gay marriage, while others do not recognise 
homosexuality. in this example, the state (national, Provincial or State authorities) 
expresses the institutionalised logic of the state-form. 
I agree with you that the nation state is an assemblage of assemblages, whether 
it is State Departments or Ministries, local authorities or whatever, along to the 
individual human and non-human bodies and computers that work for the state or 
are affected by it. This may look like an arborescent (tree-like) hierarchy, but Deleuze 
and Guattari (1) would prefer to view it as a mixture of rhizomic, vertical and 
horizontal connections. Each assemblage opens up to further assemblages: Leibniz’ 
(1) ‘ponds within ponds’. 
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GA: This leads me onto my second question concerning the link you make between
permitted striations and unpermitted smoothness. Does this mean that there are 
no striations in a shanty town?  What about the undetected squatter – do they not 
striate space in a similar way to an architect?  
JH: There is no completely smooth or striated space. Space is always a mixture of
both. Rhizomes are always partially striated. I actually disagree with Deleuze and 
Guattari that shanty towns are smooth spaces. As the excellent work of scholars 
such as Ananya Roy, Pedro Abramo and James Holston illustrates, ‘informality is a 
deregulated rather than unregulated system’ (Roy, 00: ). There are important 
striations in informal settlements. Striations include land markets, governance struc-
tures, street layouts, women’s spaces, gang and other ‘business’ territories and so 
on (Abramo, 00; Appadurai, 00; Holston, 00, 00; Roy, 00, 00, 010, 
011, 01; Zalnar and Alvito, 1). As Simone (00) has demonstrated in Africa 
in informal settlements, access to resources is generally acquired through associa-
tional (rhizomic) systems which are heavily striated and require ‘obedience’, ‘loyalty’ 
and ‘duty’. 
GA: In my last question, I would like to turn to the role of the planner in practice.
Many practicing planners will work in local governments, whilst others work in the 
private sector for private developers, and others will work in private, commercial 
companies employed by private not-for-profit companies such as housing associ-
ations working with one or several government departments. How do you think 
planners might position themselves in these different instances i.e. as part of a state 
assemblage, part of a broader project assemblage that includes one of several state 
assemblages, or outside the state assemblage (if this is possible)?  
JH: With regard to how planning practitioners might position themselves, it’s 
important to me that they recognise what they are doing. This could be enforcing 
the state-form of striation, as in development assessment planning or environmental 
regulation; or it could be challenging to deterritorialise the state-form, such as those 
working in private sector development consultancies trying to achieve extra density 
or height, or those who work for war machines such as NGOs or lobby groups, 
perhaps on behalf of people with disabilities who desire a more legible, navigable 
streetscape and street furniture. It is also important to remember that when deter-
ritorialisation occurs – i.e. the striations of the state-form are ruptured – reterritoriali-
sation will occur in some manner, in the form of new codings and guidelines. 
So I should like planners to think not only what it is they are doing and why, but also 
how their work affects human and non-human assemblages. To paraphrase Deleuze 
(11), not so much what it is, but what it can do. 
And this takes us back to the issue of ethics … 
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CHAPTER 3
What can machines do?
A  machine, for Deleuze and Guattari, is an assemblage of parts that works and produces (Goodchild, 1996: 218). It is associated with the verb ‘to machine’, meaning to assemble, make or produce, rather than some thing which is necessarily 
mechanical. Moreover, machinic production in a Deleuzoguattarian sense does not repeat 
predetermined processes. The machine, therefore, is singular and produces something 
new. The product can then become a component of further machines. Machinic relations 
are thus created. Desire, which I discussed briefly in Chapter 3, is a machinic relation as it 
generates relationships through bringing multiplicities of elements together. A machine, 
then, can be summarised as a productive assemblage of components (Goodchild, 1996: 4). 
In a Deleuzean sense, Le Corbusier was correct when he claimed that the city is a machine 
(1929). Each machine has a composition, function and potential.  
 
 There are various kinds of machines including technological machines. A house 
is a technological machine for living (Le Corbusier, 1929). A house is composed of plans, 
materials (bricks, mortar, timber, concrete, class, furnishings, people, pets etc), labour, 
finance and so on. (See Fig. 3.1)  
 
 The main function of a house is to provide shelter and comfort. Its potential is 
to produce affects in whose who encounter it. These affects may lead to emotions of joy 
or sadness, or perhaps wonder at the aesthetic taste of the designer, depending on the 
personal experiences of those involved. 
 
 Guattari (1995: 47-48) gives the example of the Franco-British aeroplane 
Concorde as a technological machine. Concorde was composed of a multiplicity of 
different machines, each with their own planes of reference: aerodynamic ideas on paper 
and the theories which underlay them; technological knowledge to translate the ideas 
into prototypes; industrial knowledge and capacity to produce the plane; political will and 
economic funding to make it happen; trained pilots to fly it; all grounded in a collective 
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desire for Concorde to be actualised. Its function was to fly faster than the speed of sound 
between London, Paris and New York. Its potential was huge, but foundered on a lack of 
economic support from changing assemblages of government regimes and a fatal crash at 
Charles de Gaulle airport, Paris in July 2000. Despite being the only fatal accident involving 
Concorde in its 27-year operational history, and no fault of the aircraft design or of any of 
the above machines, the crash sealed the fate of the plane.2 
 
 Potential is denoted by what Deleuze and Guattari term an abstract machine. 
The abstract machine is a machine that desires (it is sometimes referred to as a desiring-
machine): its potential power of existing is desire. The potential of Concorde and, similarly, 
the technological machine of a local area plan, for instance, was/is fundamentally linked to 
political, economic etc desires to produce something or to make something happen.  
 
Fig. 3.1 A House Technological-Machine 
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2 A titanium alloy strip 435mm x 230mm had fallen from a Continental Airlines DC-10 onto 
the runway some five minutes prior to Concorde taking off and a runway inspection had not been 
undertaken. The debris burst one of Concorde’s tyres and tyre debris struck the plane with such force 
that shockwaves caused a fuel tank to rupture. Leaking fuel then ignited on contact with severed 
electrical cables. Travelling too fast to abort take-off and unable to climb or accelerate, the plane 
stalled and crashed, killing all 109 people on board. Continental Airlines was subsequently found 
criminally responsible for the crash (BEA, 2002). 
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Abstract machines are vectors of creation. An abstract machine may thus be defined 
as ‘the immanent relations that constitute a particular machine, process or assemblage’ 
(Goodchild, 1996: 217). Here, the word ‘particular’ is important because abstract machines 
are not something which pre-exists, but are always incarnated in the particular.  
 
 An abstract machine links ‘unformed matters’ and ‘nonformal functions’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 141). It lays out the components of an assemblage and what 
it can do, not just in a current state, but in future states as it enters into transformative 
relations with other assemblages (Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 48). ‘Unformed matter’ is 
defined by its virtual capabilities or capacities and ‘nonformal functions’ are the virtual 
transformations of the assemblage. (I discuss the Deleuzoguattarian concepts of the 
virtual and the actual below.) For instance, the abstract machine of discipline regards 
any human or non-human animal (especially pets) as unformed matter linked to the 
nonformal function of ‘impose conduct’ or ‘control conduct’ (see Bonta and Protevi, 
2004). The abstract machine of discipline is a virtual structure which may be actualised or 
made tangible through institutions such as schools, prisons, puppy training classes, local 
authority planning departments and so on.  
 
 Capital is an abstract machine of desire. The basic mode of operation of capital 
(as explained by Massumi, 1992: 131ff) is to grasp the human body (as unformed matter) 
from the angles of its functional potential to buy or sell a commodity (a commodity 
relation) and its potential to sell its time/activities or to buy those of others (a wage 
relation). The capitalist relation is abstract because it does not matter what a body buys 
or what activities it sells, only that it buys and sells (the nonformal functions). The virtual 
structures of capital relations are actualised through institutions such as job centres, 
marketing agencies, shopping malls, banking systems and so on. 
 
 Concrete machines are assemblages of particular arrangements of material and 
discursive elements which construct a singular version of a thing (eg a place). Guattari 
indicates that concrete machines functionally cross times and spaces, insides and outsides, 
subjects and objects. ‘They will not manufacture time and space “in general” but this time 
and this space lived by a particular assemblage in a particular context’ (Guattari, 2011: 
106). Concrete machines thus socially organise or territorialise perceptions and meanings 
through systematisation/institutionalisation of particular ways of seeing and under-
standing through redundancies of representation between abstract machines and the strata 
of power. Van Wezemael and Paisiou (2011) demonstrate how project plans can perform as 
concrete machines. Project plans have the capacity to assemble materialities and expressi-
vities such as steel, trees, bitumen, information, political will and so on and simultaneously 
to use, activate and organise a system of connections between these elements such that one 
singular version of reality is represented: the desired project.  
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 However, concrete machines offer ‘a practical “either-or”’ (Guattari, 1984: 157) 
to actions becoming territorialised as above. Redundancies can also ‘open up the possible’ 
(Guattari, ibid) onto lines of flight; to deterritorialise accepted meanings or doxa and to 
reterritorialise new understandings which may, for instance, be more socially or environ-
mentally just (see Hillier, 2013a, 2013b).  
 
 War machines effect lines of flight (see Chapter 2). They have no essential 
relationship to war. Deleuze and Guattari’s concept is of a ‘war machine which precisely 
does not have war as its object’ (1987: 523). Rather, a war machine engenders the 
production of something new; new ways of thinking, new ways of being. In local planning, 
for instance, war machines are often grassroots assemblages which are generated by 
common desires for something other than that which is proposed in the plan. A resident 
action group as war machine may thus ‘wage war’ on existing orders of knowledge and 
codings of land. It both resists what is and, by fleeing, creates the new. It is important 
to state, however, that the ‘new’ may also function as a repressive machine (such as 
the Taliban in Afghanistan). There are no guarantees that the creative new will not be 
destructive. 
 
 It is time to turn to Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of the virtual and the actual 
as they underpin so much of the authors’ work. Understanding the virtual is made easier 
by many people’s familiarity with electronic virtual worlds such as Second Life. For Deleuze 
and Guattari, the virtual is the pre-possible, before there is any conceptualisation of alter-
native possibilities or potentialities. Ballantyne (2007: 35) describes it as ‘the soup from 
which the emergent properties will in due course emerge, but with no sense as yet of what 
those emerging properties are going to be’. 
 
 Ballantyne (2005) offers the example of a polypropylene box. Whilst it is not in 
use, the box is ‘virtually’ all the things it could be used for, from a storage container or 
carrier for things, upside down as a stool or table, a ‘play’ house or car for a child, bed for a 
pet or whatever is desired. If someone sits on the box, they have actualised it as becoming a 
seat and other potential uses remain virtual. In urban design, the virtual is the state before 
a design is conceived, where anything might be possible. It resists representation. 
 
The actual is what is; that which we can perceptually and tangibly grasp. But any actual 
thing, whether it is a stool or an urban design scheme, is only possible because reality has 
a virtual dimension. The virtual and the actual are always co-present. The actual is what 
effectuates the virtual, but it can never completely activate all that the virtual implies, as 
Ballantyne’s example of the box illustrates. 
 
 So, as Rajchman (1998: 117) asks, how can we as architects, planners, designers 
and so on conceive of, and deal with, something that is essentially ungraspable? His answer 
is that we need to experiment with what the virtual might become if we did x or y. In other 
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words, to ask the question, ‘what might happen if …?’ For Rajchman (1998: 117), this 
would involve holding together ‘the most, and most complicated “different possible worlds” 
in the same container’, whether that container is a house, a mainstreet design or a strategic 
plan, in order to allow flexibility as circumstances change, often unexpectedly. Recalling 
that the house, design or plan can never exhaust the virtual, we then appreciate that there 
is always the potential for something else to actualise. ‘The virtual is the realm of produc-
tivity, of functioning otherwise than its plan or blueprint, functioning in excess of design 
and intention’ (Grosz, 2001: 130). We should learn to expect the unexpected. 
 
 Between the virtual and the actual there is Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of 
emergence. The virtual is what conditions emergence and the actual is what emerges. 
Linked to physics and complexity theories, emergence implies movement and change.  
 
 A related, and important, concept for Deleuze and Guattari is that of becoming. 
Becoming constitutes passage towards a new assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 
257-258). It may refer to a process and a noun. As a noun, becoming implies the pathways 
along which an assemblage may be transformed whilst retaining some resemblance to its 
former self. Deleuze and Guattari cite the example of the wasp-orchid assemblage (1987: 
Fig. 3.1 The wasp-orchid assemblage 
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10). The Drakaea (wasp-orchid), for instance, is a genus of Australian orchid, often named 
the Hammer Orchid, which is pollinated only by the Thynnid wasp. Female Thynnid wasps 
are flightless and so have to wait on top of flower stems for male wasps to arrive in order 
to mate. A Drakaea flower assumes the resemblance of/codes itself as a female wasp in the 
colour of its labellum (see Fig. 3.1) and production of similar pheromones. When a male 
wasp lands on the labellum, some of the orchid’s pollen will adhere to it. Eventually, the 
male wasp realises that he hasn’t landed on a female and flies off to try again. When he 
lands on another orchid, he transfers pollen to this plant, thereby effecting pollination of 
the orchid. 
 
 In the wasp-orchid assemblage, both the wasp and the orchid are changed by 
their incorporation into the assemblage (eg by the addition of pollen) which is marked 
by emergent properties greater than the sum of the parts (pollination). The becoming 
of a wasp-orchid assemblage is an alliance of heterogeneous parts (Bonta and Protevi, 
2004: 59). In the process of becoming wasp-orchid, the encounter between the wasp 
and the orchid releases something from each (deterritorialisation) and, in the process, 
releases a series of enabling and potentialities by which the entity is transformed 
(reterritorialisation).  
 
 
GA: If planning is about working with the virtual, then the next question we might
ask is how do these potential come into being to form the cities and building we 
see around us? Your text suggests that this happens through ‘emergence’, but 
form many, the idea of emergence would be seen in opposition to the idea of 
engagement. Indeed, many planners, masterplanners, architects and builders would 
suggest that they were fundamental to the actualisation of the town or building 
assemblage. How would you respond to this?  
 
JH: In most Western jurisdictions, planning powers are almost exclusively negative.
Where public ownership and funding for projects is limited, the power of planning 
lies in regulatory control. Local planning authority planners have to wait for private 
sector and infrastructure assemblages to approach them, requesting permission to 
do something. Local planners might design a new outer suburban district centre, or 
redesign a run-down inner suburban streetscape, but they are unable to actualise 
the shops and cafés which they hope to see there. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari (1) suggest that good artisans will work with the potentials 
which materials themselves suggest, rather than dreaming up ideas for imposition 
on what is supposedly passive. So, although I agree that planners are probably 
fundamental to the actualisation of, say, the district centre assemblage, they are 
definitely not the only actors (human or non-human) involved. There is thus much 
scope for things to not turn out as planned; for something to emerge in the gap 
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between plan and built form, between virtual and actual. Deleuze was highly critical 
of suggestions that ‘production is the result of an (architectural) imposition of a 
transcendent form on a chaotic and/or passive matter’ (Protevi, 001: ). In planning 
and architecture this would translate into not rigidly imposing transcendent, prede-
termined form on immanent elements that are likely to change; i.e. working with the 
elements, not on them.  
 
A good example of this would be the construction of a block of apartments in 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne, UK, over a culvert. In 01, the culvert collapsed in heavy 
rain and, some four months later, a period of prolonged rain led to a washout and 
ground subsidence leaving the apartments perched precariously above the raging 
water. The apartments will have to be demolished.  
 
In working with elements and their potentitlities, planners and architects would, 
hopefully, understand that humans and non-humans are complex mixtures of virtual 
and actual which have the capacity to interact with other humans and non-humans 
in unforeseen and unforeseeable ways. This has particular resonance, I think, not 
only for land use planning, but with regard to environmental planning and ecolo-
gical thinking, as issues of climate change, salinity, as well as flooding and so on, 
exemplify. 
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 Becoming characterises events. Event is another of those awkward 
Deleuzoguattarian terms which is much debated. I will attempt to keep my expla-
nation simple, so rather reductionist, by defining an event as a ‘happening’. For Deleuze, 
events involve activity and change. They are both process and product: the emergence 
of something and the effect of a synthesis of forces. (See my cake example in Fig. 2.3.) 
An event takes place at the threshold of being and becoming; between material actual 
and immaterial forces. We cannot organise an event to achieve any pre-given effect as 
effects are generated at the moment of the forces’ interaction. Furthermore, events are not 
produced as copies, or in the image, of anything. They are ‘wholly immanent, original and 
creative productions’ (Stagoll, 2010: 91). Events have no determinate outcome, simply new 
possibilities. Their effects, however, do change relationships for ever. An event is never a 
beginning, nor an end, but always ‘in the middle’. 
 
 Events can range through the local – such as a tree greening in spring (Stagoll, 
2010) or reddening in autumn – to something like a building or an old wall falling down 
– which may kill insects, animals and/or humans by its fall, affecting multiplicities of 
assemblages, as well as opening up different vistas of what lies beyond and offering new 
connections - to the momentous, such as 9/11 in New York which has led to changes in 
requirements for air travel and ‘security’ legislation around the world. 
 
 The virtual is laid out on the plane (a field or even a plan) of immanence. In 
fact, the plane of immanence includes both the virtual and its actualisation simultaneously 
(Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 149). What Deleuze means by this is that purely actual objects 
cannot exist, as I explained above with the example of Ballantyne’s box.  
 
 Deleuze and Guattari refer to the plane of immanence (1994) sometimes as the 
plane of consistency (1987), which can be quite confusing, especially as by ‘consistency’ 
they mean ‘composition’ (this is the plane where things are ‘composed’), rather than 
conformity, coherence or non-variability. This would be the very opposite. To reduce 
the confusion, I will simply refer to the plane as that of immanence.  
 
 The opposite plane to that of immanence is what Deleuze and Guattari call the 
plane of organisation (1987) or transcendence (1994). Again, since the two terms effectively 
mean the same thing to Deleuze and Guattari, and since the inherent property of transcen-
dence – that values come from ‘outside’, a ‘higher’ sphere beyond the limits of experience 
– is commonly associated with theology, which would be a confusing diversion here, 
I will refer to the plane as the plane of organisation. This is potentially the easier term for 
planners to remember, engaged as they often are, in ‘organisation’ of land uses. 
Fig. 3.2 offers descriptors of the planes of immanence and of organisation. 
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 The plane of immanence is a plane (or plan) defined not by what it contains, but 
‘rather by the forces that intersect it and the things it can do’ (Kaufman, 1998: 6). It is the 
Deleuzoguattarian virtual realm of potentialities. It is the temporary product of mapping 
power or forces (see below). As Kaufman (1998: 6) continues, such mapping ‘is at once the 
act of charting out a pathway and the opening of that pathway to the event of the chance 
encounter’. Bonta and Protevi (2004: 64) indicate that the ‘key move’ is to construct a plane 
by collaborative experimentation. 
 
 On the plane of immanence all possibilities are brought together and new 
connections are made and unmade continuously. The plane of immanence is thus a 
continual process of emergence. The plane is not something closed or the end of a process 
with specific targets to be achieved. It is a plane (perhaps a long-term strategic plan or 
trajectory) where ‘heterogeneous elements come together to form open-ended ensembles 
[assemblages], rhizomatic multiplicities governed by processes of becoming’ (Patton, 1986: 
np). It is a plane of foresight; of trajectory, of creative transformation, of what might be. 
Chance is important, however. There is always the potential for unforeseen lines of flight 
to emerge (for example, a change in government retail policy, enormous increases in fuel 
prices, consumer refusal to shop at monopolistic or multinational retail outlets without 
fair-trade policies, and so on). 
 
 The plane of immanence is not any one definite concept that is, or can be. Neither 
is it a method, a state of knowledge nor a set of opinions. Rather it ‘functions like a sieve 
Fig. 3.2 Schematic Descriptors of the Planes of Immanence and Organisation 
(SOURCE, HILLIER, 2011B)
Plane of Immanence 
relation ‘in’ 
becomings/emergence 
open-ended trajectories 
multiplicities of meshworks 
chance/aleatory 
chaotic smooth space 
(with some regulation/striation) 
unstructured 
dynamism of unformed elements 
flux and fluidity 
power to/puissance
Plane of Organisation 
relation ‘to’ 
transcendence 
closed goals 
hierarchical relations of power 
planned development 
regulated striated space 
(with some chaos/smoothness) 
structured 
stability of judgement and identity 
inertia or sluggish movement 
power over/pouvoir 
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over chaos’ (Boundas, 2005: 273), implying a sort of ‘groping experimentation’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1994: 41) of multiplicities of ideas, many of which never come to be as 
originally intended. The plane of immanence lays out the ‘potential logic’ of place. One of 
the tasks of the strategic spatial planner is to ‘”flush forms” out of the chaotic state of the 
plane of immanence’ (Frichot, 2005: 68). As Frichot perceptively continues: ‘the plane of 
immanence leaves us with bloodshot eyes, ringing ears, ground down teeth, exhausted 
limbs and in a thorough state of perplexity. Nevertheless, as we travel upon the plane of 
immanence every day, we have mostly become habituated to its continuous upsurge of 
novelty. As social actors, often contained by fixed scripts, susceptible to cliché [habit] and 
opinion [doxa], we are happy to brush off the interfering noise of immanence, and just get 
down to business’ (ibid). 
 
 As illustrated in Fig. 4.2, Deleuzoguattarian planes of organisation support the 
day-to-day elements of personal and social life. These planes contain hierarchical power 
relations which striate our worlds (into zones of land uses, for example) and fix identities 
(such as female, male; resident of suburb x or town y). This is a teleological plane of 
purpose (‘a design, a mental principle’ [Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 265]) concerned with 
the development of forms and the formation of subjects supported by stability of identity  
and judgement.  
 
 The plane of organisation is a master plan or blueprint with certain goals for 
development. These goals are predetermined standards (such as land use regulations or 
a mainstreet design scheme) to which things are submitted in judgement and ordered by 
forms of representation (whether applications meet the standard criteria). Local area plans, 
design briefs, detailed projects are typical planes of organisation. They tend to be relatively 
local or micro-scale, short-term and content specific. They facilitate small movements or 
changes along the dynamic, open trajectories of planes of immanence.  
 
 The planes of immanence and organisation exist simultaneously and are inter-
leaved; a multitude of layers that are sometimes fairly closely knit together and sometimes 
more separate. Deleuze suggests that these might be vertical relations of thought: above, ‘a 
battle, a turbulent, stormy zone where particular points and the relations of forces between 
these points are tossed about’ (Deleuze, 1988c: 121) – the plane of immanence – while 
below lies the area in which are ‘collected and solidified the visual dust and the sonic echo 
of the battle raging above them’ (Deleuze, 1988c: 121, both citations in Stivale, 2006: 86). 
But Deleuze also describes continuous movement in ‘a diagram of forces or particular 
features which are taken up by relations: a strategy’ (1988c: 121). The vertical movements 
link with the horizontal tensions and torsions in a struggle with which practitioners must 
engage in their own manners, casting planes (plans) over the chaos (Stivale, 2006: 88), to 
‘tear open the firmament itself, to let in a bit of free and windy chaos and to frame in a 
sudden light a vision that appears through the rent’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 203, 
cited in Stivale, 2006: 88). 
AESOP        YOUNG ACADEMIC NETWORK
 So, what can machines do? 
 Machines assemble, make or produce. The human or animal body as a machine 
is constituted by many other machines, including an eating machine of food processing 
(mouth, digestive system etc), a breathing machine (nose, lungs etc), a thinking machine 
(brain, neurons etc). These machines are, in turn, all composed from other machines: 
the mouth is a machine comprising teeth, tongue and so on. Teeth are made of enamel, 
calcium, nerves etc etc …. and … and … and. 
 
 Through concepts of machining, immanence, emergence, becoming and event 
in this Chapter, we can see Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis on creative change or trans-
formation: what may be regarded as an ontology of the new or an ontology of difference.3 
 
GA: In your work you talk about making a strategic plan as a plane of immanence,
or more precisely as a figure of the plane of immanence (Hillier, 00). You also 
talk about local plans as a plane of transcendence. You have noted that Deleuze’s 
ontology is flat, so I suspect that you do not intend this distinction to be based on 
scale. Can you help clarify what you mean when you make this distinction? 
 
JH: I rather abbreviated my explanation of how I think that Deleuze’s planes of
immanence and organisation (I prefer to use the term organisation to transcen-
dence) might be applied to spatial planning as I have written about this at length 
elsewhere (Hillier, 011b). I obviously make a huge oversimplification of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concepts and I believe that all spatial plans will inevitably reference both 
planes. For instance, all forms of spatial plans could be defined not by what they 
contain, but by the forces which intersect them and what they can do. Similarly, all 
plans could be the temporary product (until they are reviewed or superseded) of 
mapping force relations and charting out potential pathways.  
 
But I think that it is useful for strategic spatial planners to think of longer-term 
strategic plans (of, say, 1 years duration) as relating to planes of immanence 
because they are really speculations on what might be; something which records 
desiring-production. Such plans represent the coding of disorganised flux or chaos; 
the virtual realm of potentialities. As Stagoll (00: 0) explains, ‘to think of this 
field of possibilities means arranging it according to some concept …, thereby 
constructing a temporary and virtual arrangement according to causal, logical and 
temporal relations. Such thinking is always a response to some particular set of 
circumstances’. The strategic spatial plan might be regarded as the skeletal frame 
or figure of the virtual plane; ‘the breath that suffuses’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1: 
3 Note that this is not difference to or from anything else, but difference-in-itself. The leaves on a tree 
may turn green in spring or red in autumn, but they remain the same leaves on the same tree. They are 
not different leaves, but different in themselves. 
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) its parts, the plan as the concrete assemblage of the plane as the abstract 
machine of which the assemblages are ‘working parts’ (ibid). 
 
This is why I am keen that longer-term strategic spatial plans give up including very 
detailed targets (such as x square metres of retail floorspace, provision of y housing 
units in specified locations, or z jobs) when we cannot predict what will happen in 
say two years’ time, let alone in 1. I think that trajectories towards more flexible 
‘goals’, such as habitability or sustainability, offer the capacity (puissance) for 
adaptability that strategic spatial planning on the longer-term requires. It seems to 
be usual for longer-term strategic spatial plans to be prepared for whole municipa-
lities, sub-regions or even regions, which is where the ‘scale’ issue comes in. 
 
Since there is a need for detailed spatial plans to regulate development, I think 
that it makes more sense to prepare these at more local scales and over shorter 
time periods than the more visionary documents I have just talked about. This is 
where I find Deleuze and Guattari’s plane of organisation useful. Planes of organi-
sation contain hierarchical power relations which striate our worlds (into land use 
classifications or zones, for instance). As Deleuze and Guattari (1: ) explain, 
planes of organisation are teleological designs and mental principles concerned 
with the development of forms and the formation of subjects supported by stability 
of judgment and identity. We can only have stability of judgment over short time 
periods for the most part as actors and circumstances change.  
 
The plane of organisation is a master plan with certain goals. These goals are prede-
termined standards (such as land use regulations, design guidelines and so on) to 
which things are submitted in judgement and ordered by forms of representation 
(whether applications meet the standard criteria etc). I think that local Area Action 
Plans or Development Plans, design briefs, detailed project briefs fit this description 
and are figures on planes of organisation. They tend to be relatively local or micro-
scale, short-term and content specific. They facilitate small movements or changes 
along the dynamic, open trajectories of planes of immanence.  
 
With regard to scale, a ‘flat’ ontology does not necessarily mean only horizontal. 
It means what Leitner et al (00) call ‘co-implicated’ – looking among connec-
tions between people, places and assemblages – rather than down or up at them. 
Entanglement rather than embedding. I think that this is implied when Deleuze and 
Guattari state that we inhabit both planes at once and by their insistence that ‘every 
politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a micropolitics’ (1: 1). 
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CHAPTER 4
What can nature do?
D eleuze and Guattari’s world is one of continuity between human and non-human behaviours. Each species (including homo sapiens) creates its own territories through its percepts, concepts and affects: the assemblages and events in which it 
participates. The assemblages and territories intersect. 
 Mark Halsey’s (2006) study of the old-growth forest in Goolengook, Australia, 
demonstrates how attempts by forest-administrators to striate nature on a plane of organi-
sation severely limits their potential for dealing with the forests. As Halsey explains, ‘the 
guiding objective of environmental administrators becomes the location and categorisation 
of a delimited series of attributes common to a field (of species, of classes, of types) as 
opposed to establishing categories on the basis of the relations pertaining between indivi-
duals and their associated becomings’ (2006: 238, emphasis added). To change the way in 
which foresters depict and manage their world to a relational view would, as Halsey (2006: 
239) points out, inevitably result in ‘the sudden and dramatic demise of modern forest 
management principles premised as they are on the notion that great sections of forest can 
be clearfelled without serious consequence since there also exist … other sections “just 
like them”’. Forest planes of immanence become planes of organisation become ‘harvested’ 
timber.
 I have demonstrated similar effects both in old-growth forests in south-west West 
Australia (Hillier, 2007, Chapter 6) and also in the ways in which Environmental Impact 
Assessments striate and codify environmental ‘types’, such as wetlands and sand dunes, 
prior to ‘measuring’ them or allocating them ‘values’ (Hillier, 1999a, 1999b). 
 As Mark Bonta (2004: 99) explains, Deleuzoguattarian geophilosophy combines 
the non-linear, open systems approach of complexity theory with the fluidity of poststruc-
turalism: ‘it allows us to move beyond the impasses of interpretation-based and signifier-
driven accounts of space (landscape-as-text; discourse as primordial) without becoming 
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trapped in essentialist, authenticity-bound “who’s right?” scenarios’. Deleuzoguattarian-
inspired analysis can help us understand the ways in which different human and 
non-human actors (including places) can interrelate, engage in conflict, generate 
cross-factorial alliances, de- and re-codify/de- and re-territorialise space.
 For instance, in environmental debates, assemblages of actors ‘deterritorialise 
forces of the earth … and put them to work in a different way, stratifying them in different 
sequences, drawing from elements common to them – on the physico-chemical, geolo-
gical, biological and human strata – but for different purposes’ (Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 
174). The deterritorialised elements of non-human spaces are thus subjected to attempts by 
different human-centred assemblages to reterritorialise the spaces and overcode them in 
some way, whether for economic, environmental conservation, social or political purposes. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 9) also recognise that although powerful sign systems may 
dominate or overcode a multiplicity, such overcoding will inevitably be temporary as 
‘multiplicities are defined by the outside: by the abstract line, the line of flight or deter-
ritorialisation according to which they change in nature’. Humans will never completely 
overcode non-human multiplicities. Non-human actors may operate according to different 
temporalities to humans and have voice in different manners, but act and speak they will.4 
 Verena Conley (1993, 1997) develops Guattari’s (2000) concept of ecosophy 
as a way of moving beyond the dialectical oppositions of human/non-human. Guattari’s 
ecosophy consists of three interrelated registers: mental ecology (how we construct ecosy-
stems, time, space and so on), social ecology (the everyday practices of life) and environ-
mental ecology (a broad reconsideration of nature which radically decentres current 
constructions and practices). Of these, Guattari stresses the importance of mental ecology. 
Without a reorientation of how we construct or subjectivate ourselves and non-humans 
in relation to space and time, little else will happen than continued destruction (Guattari, 
2000: 41) as there are no closed ‘systems’.
 In thinking about what nature can do, Jane Bennett (2004, 2010) develops 
Guattari’s ecosophy and Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas of ‘material vitalism’ concerning the 
immanence of matter-energy: ‘thing-power’. Bennett’s (2010: x) aims include to dissipate 
onto-theological binaries of life/matter, human/animal, will/determination and organic/
inorganic in order to induce an openness of humans to material vitality and to develop 
a form of political analysis that can account for the contributions of non-human agents. 
Regarding assemblages as comprising humans and non-humans would enable us, for 
instance, to appreciate the role of bees in our food chains, of chickens in the spread of avian 
flu, of how sand storms may influence the spread of sectarian violence (Bennett, 2010: 107) 
and so on. As Bennett comments, ‘if human culture is inextricably enmeshed with vibrant, 
nonhuman agencies, and if human intentionality can be agentic only if accompanied by 
4 For example, mass clearing of trees for agricultural purposes in Australia has caused huge problems 
of salinity which are severely threatening agricultural holdings and livelihoods. Tree clearing is also 
related to flood devastation and erosion.
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a vast entourage of nonhumans, then it seems that the appropriate unit of analysis for 
democratic theory is neither the individual human nor an exclusively human collective 
but the (ontologically heterogeneous) “public” coalescing round a problem’ (2010: 108). 
In order to achieve this, we will need to devise new processes that both recognise the 
important role of non-humans (Guattari’s ‘nascent subjectivity’) and which enable us to 
involve non-human ‘voices’ in strategic policy and development assessment decisions. But 
how we might do this is not simple and Bennett gives us no real answers.
 What nature can do is related to the anthropocentric issue of what humans 
permit nature to do (eg levees to prevent flooding, cloud seeding to shift rain patterns, 
groynes to contain longshore drift of beachfronts and so on). We tend to overlook that 
elements are not fully determined by their relations (see Chapter 2). Additionally, we 
may not recognise that there are many elements and relations of which we are completely 
unaware, some of which may be currently unknowable to our research methodologies. 
Even when we are aware of relations (such as human effects on climate change), we may 
choose to ignore them. This is often a matter of politics. There has been much discussion 
of Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy and whether it can be reconfigured as a 
political program or model (see the review in Buchanan and Thoburn, 2008).
 Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 213) comment that ‘everything is political, but every 
politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a micropolitics’. With regard to macropo-
litics, in Anti-Oedipus (1984) Deleuze and Guattari regard the State as an all-embracing 
power (pouvoir) which brought together labour power and the conditions necessary for 
the creation of surplus-value. Whilst the power of the State vis-à-vis capital has clearly 
declined since Deleuze and Guattari wrote, it nevertheless remains that ‘one of the funda-
mental tasks of the State is to striate the space over which it reigns …. [T]he State does not 
dissociate itself from a process of capture of flows of all kinds, populations, commodities or 
commerce, money or capital etc. There is still a need for fixed paths in well-defined direc-
tions, which restrict speed, regulate circulation, relativize movement, and measure in detail 
the relative movement of subjects and objects’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 385-386). 
Think, for example, of what the State has performed in the name of ‘Homeland Security’ to 
capture flows of migrants; of how ‘movements’ are ‘measured’ by ubiquitous CCTVs, GPS 
systems in mobile phones and cars, by Facebook and Google; of taxation, levies and duties. 
However, when public opinion called for States to regulate the banks in the early 21st 
Century financial crisis, State ministers lacked the courage to do so.
 The State operates through capture of movement and the partition of space in 
order to control the development of potential war machines and cut off possibilities of 
lines of flight (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 386). Yet the State never entirely constrains or 
neutralises micropolitics, and it is here that Deleuze and Guattari see most potential for 
revalorisation of decision making in favour of the marginalised. However, Deleuze and 
Guattari are not necessarily concerned with opposition between individuals/groups and 
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the State per se, but rather between the lines that appear in and cut across individuals/
groups and society (such as environmental movements). As Guattari commented, ‘why 
would you look to a party or a State apparatus to liberate desires?’ (in Deleuze, 2004b: 32). 
It is not the control of State power or macropolitics which interests Deleuze and Guattari, 
but the forms of social change which can occur ‘alongside or beneath any given form of 
State’ (Patton, 2000: 8). 
 This has led several commentators (eg May, 1991, 1994) to suggest that Deleuze 
and Guattari’s politics are a form of anarchism or anarcho-syndicalism. Deleuze and 
Guattari are more interested in locally relevant micropolitical tactics than in a broader 
strategic political thought: in particular or local ‘revolutionary-becoming’ rather than 
wholesale social change (Patton, 2000, 2012). ‘Top-down’ reasoning would restrict 
emergent, ‘bottom-led’ understandings of the world and lines of flight. However, Deleuze 
and Guattari do not leave everything in the hands of local stakeholders. They argue that 
‘molecular escapes and movements would be nothing if they did not return to the molar 
organisations to reshuffle their segments’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 216-217), of broad 
stratifications of class, gender, sexuality and so on. In other words, Deleuze and Guattari 
look to the strength (puissance) of creative lines of flight to disrupt (deterritorialise) 
and transform doxa and dogmatic systems into new forms (reterritorialisation). By this, 
Deleuze and Guattari do not necessarily mean the abolition of ‘molar’ (eg State) organisa-
tions, but their transformation into a ‘fabric of immanent relations’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987: 358). Neither does ‘revolutionary-becoming’ imply classical forms of revolution with 
coups d’état and so on. Rather, Tampio (2009), Nail (2012) and others read revolutionary-
becoming as including problem-based participatory forms of inclusive, democratic organi-
sation. Examples are offered of the international Occupy movement and the Zapatistas in 
Chiapas. Mexico (Nail, 2012; Ruddick, 2012).
 Deleuze and Guattari, then, do not advocate any specific end-state or principles, 
for instance, for environmental or social justice, despite being active in several movements 
in France. Patton (2000, 2012) suggests that we should not be surprised by this, as Deleuze 
and Guattari’s political philosophic thinking pre-dates much of the Western debate on 
Marx and distributive justice. It is not the entity, therefore, but the process which interests 
Deleuze and Guattari.
 So, what could ecopolitics do?
 Nail describes the Mexican Zapatistas’ self-management of their ecosystems as 
a ‘model for a post-neoliberal environmentalism’ (2010: 183). Based in an autonomous 
federation of towns and villages with democratic, participatory councils for ecological self-
government, policy is decided through a procedure of ‘counting the affects’ of a situation 
(Nail, 2010: 185), working through who and what has the capacity to affect or be affected 
and with what implications for humans and non-human nature.
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GA Here you seem to be pointing us towards an approach to planning that rejects
an inherent distinction between the human and the non-human. How might this 
be possible in practice? When a planner reflects on non-human issues, they do so 
through ecological reports, policies on flood protection etc. This seems to be less 
problematic in other, connected plan-making professions such as architecture. As 
you note above, an architect’s plans should be created to work with the potentia-
lities from related human and non-human entities ie to work with the movement of 
water across the site, the composition of the ground, the absorption rate of bricks, 
the bricklayer’s ability to lay bricks in different locations, the architect’s details for 
controlling how water is directed through and around the building etc. With this 
in mind, how do we encourage planners to work with these human– non-human 
potentialities and relations in planning? What barriers would we need to overcome? 
And what might this mean for the profession?
JH: Deleuze and Guattari’s work – especially that of Félix Guattari – is post-human
in that it attempts to avoid anthropocentrism and regards homo sapiens as one of 
many species: ‘we make no distinction between man (sic) and nature: the human 
essence of nature and the natural essence of man become one within nature … 
man and nature are not like two opposite terms confronting each other – not even 
in the sense of bipolar opposites within a relationship of causation, ideation, or 
expression (cause and effect, subject and object, etc); rather they are one and the 
same essential reality, the producer-product’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1: -). It 
then follows that humans have no inherent rights to regard nature in a functional, 
human-serving manner or to set themselves up above nature. 
For Guattari (000), capital exerts a determining role over, or captures, both environ-
mental and mental ecologies. (We can see this, for instance, in activities of drilling 
for oil in the Alaskan Arctic National wildlife Refuge, fracking in the USA, UK and 
Australia, the extinction of the African western black rhino due to poaching and 
slaughter for horn in Cameroon and many other examples.) Guattari argues that we 
need to deal with this problem of capitalism if we are to not destroy the planet.
Deleuze and Guattari argue that political assemblages should no longer aim at the 
control of nature, but rather be shaped by transversal communication between the 
living and non-living, such that ‘mastery over nature is replaced by intervention 
within an immanent process’ (Goodchild, 010: ). But we have what seems 
to be an insurmountable paradox. On one hand, we humans may be capable of 
developing new ‘techno-fixes’ (such as solar power rather than coal-fired power 
stations) which help us reduce carbon emissions which accentuate global warming. 
But on the other hand, there are strong political, social and economic vested 
interests which may prevent us from operationalising the techno-fixes on a sufficient 
scale to make a difference.
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Guattari stresses the need for a redefinition of societal values to act with a sense 
of responsibility for non-human nature as well as for humans. This means thinking 
nature as a negotiation of dynamic assemblages of humans and non-humans. 
Clearly there is a need for a ‘big picture’ approach to issues, such as global 
warming, in which the entire human world participates. But there is also a critical 
role for site=specific approaches based in comprehension of and responsible 
working with the ‘resonances, alliances and feedback loops’ (Herzogenrath, 00: 
) between human and non-human nature. This is different from deep ecology, as 
espoused by scholars such as Arne Naess for instance. Deep ecology tends to 
be heavily essentialist and may actually deny difference, rather than embrace the 
coexistence of interrelated differences and the unique capacities to affect and be 
affected of different modes of existence (Hayden, 1). 
The implications of applying a Deleuzoguattarian approach to nature would most 
likely mean that environmental law needs to change to position the human in an 
ecological plane both beyond the anthropocentric and beyond the construction of 
prescriptive idealities, whilst not being co-opted by political and economic interests 
(see Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 011). Is this possible? Personally, I don’t know, 
but I hope so.
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CHAPTER 5
What can spatial planning practice do?
C an there be such a thing as Deleuzean-inspired spatial planning? If so, it would appreciate that construction of the region/city/neighbourhood/house is never complete but always-already in change. With regard to urban design/archi-
tecture, Ballantyne (2007: 82ff) explains the interdependence of elements in an assem-
blage (eg humans, non-human nature, built form etc) referring to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
(1987) example of von Uexküll’s (1965) tick which latches onto mammals as its milieu 
(environment). Von Uexküll demonstrated how the animal and its milieu are intricately 
linked, necessary for the animal to survive. The assemblage organism-plus-milieu cannot 
be described in Cartesian terms. It is ‘formless’ (Ballantyne, 2007: 86); something with 
which architects, designers and planners cannot cope and so they represent ‘form’ in effect 
as a social construction of the relations, networks and flows of towns, neighbourhoods and 
so on.
 State-driven spatial planning attempts to impose form or order on the formless, 
but as Ballantyne (2007: 88) comments. ‘that is not what makes them work, and it is no way 
to understand urban design’. He continues: ‘towns make the milieu for individual buildings, 
and one needs to understand the interdependence of building and milieu if one is to design 
a successful building – a building that sustains life, and that becomes a thriving organism’ 
(ibid). One could easily substitute mainstreet, local centre etc for ‘building’ in this sentence.
 Too often, planning permission is given for individual buildings as ‘well-defined 
object-parcels that tend to separate themselves from their surroundings’ (Ballantyne, 2007: 
88). Each building/mainstreet/centre may be aesthetically attractive, but out of synch 
with the human and non-human (birds, animals, plants, snow, rain etc) life of the city. If 
a ‘regenerated’ local centre does not mesh relationally with the elements which generate 
liveliness and vitality, then it will most likely remain unused, not even by groups of skate-
boarders and hoodies.
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Process is what matters then, rather than an end product of detailed targets, set in stone. 
Longer-term strategic spatial planning might be seen as a trajectory in the direction of …, 
rather than as straight lines to … As Deleuze (1997: lvi) wrote, ‘every work is a voyage, a 
journey, but one travels along this or that external path only by virtue of the internal paths 
and trajectories that compose it’. 
 Deleuze’s ideas about immanence lead me to suggest that strategic spatial 
planning (and perhaps mainstreet/local centre redevelopment) should not be concerned 
with setting out all possibilities in advance. It should recognise Deleuze and Guattari’s 
virtual. A plan, then, should always be incomplete so as to be able to respond to the 
‘unforeseen moments in what happens in us and to us that open up onto new histories, 
new paths in the “complication” of our ways of being’ (Rajchman, 2000: 61). A plan consti-
tutes a space whose rules can themselves be altered through what happens in it. For me, 
the role of a plan is not to predict but to ‘remain attentive to the unknown knocking at 
the door’ (Deleuze, 1994). A plan is about connections of all the senses, of people, nature, 
space and time: ‘and’ or ‘with’. 
 ‘To make connections one needs not knowledge or certainty, but rather a trust 
that something may come out, though one is not yet completely sure what’ (Rajchman, 
2000: 7). A ‘belief of the future, in the future’ (Deleuze, 1994: 6). However, this is not to 
suggest abdicating responsibility for trying to prepare for a ‘better’ future than the present, 
even if transcendent notions of ‘the good’ are destabilised and dissolved. Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987: 483) write of an ‘anexact yet rigorous’ practice which is ‘open and connec-
table in all of its dimensions’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 12); a continuous exchange of 
striated and smooth space, of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation.
 Some points of crystallisation have to exist as decisions are taken, however much 
definitive grounds for acting may be absent. In the spirit of Deleuze’s (1989: 91) view of 
the crystal as ‘the bursting forth of life’, I am keen to regard decision making opportunities 
as kaironic, embracing both kairos as timeliness of opportune moment and as a time of 
tension, a problem which must be solved (Patton, 1997). Smith (1969) links kairos with 
phronesis (practical wisdom)5 to offer an ability to act timely and wisely. Time-space 
is thus ‘pulsed’ (Deleuze, 1977), comprising pulsations of territorialisation mixed with 
non-pulsed smoothness. Whether pulsations of spatial planning committee meetings and 
development assessment decisions or strategic planning timelines, pulsations of time and 
space are imposed on actors who are thereby ordered.
 I embrace a Deleuzean-inspired view of planning practice which allows 
unexpected elements to come into play and things not to quite work out as expected. This 
allows me to see planning and planners as experiments or speculations enmeshed in a 
series of modulating networked relationships in circumstances at the same time both rigid 
5 See Flyvbjerg (1993, 2001, 2004, 2012) and Gunder (1997) for discussion of phronesis in planning 
decision making and research.
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and flexible, where outcomes are volatile. where problems are not ‘solved’ once and for all 
but are rather recast as necessary, reformulated in new perspectives (Hillier, 2007: 189). 
For example, with regard to the smog which occasionally hangs over the city of Perth, 
West Australia, the question is one of whether the smog is due to traffic fumes or farmers 
burning off hay stubble. Such questions are an issue of problematisation of representations 
rather than of neat solutions.
 The UN-Habitat Global Report on Human Settlements (2009) calls for 
development of systems of strategic spatial planning which include provision of a flexible, 
‘forward’ long-range spatial plan consisting of broad frameworks and principles, with 
which detailed local area plans and mega-projects should mesh. This resonates with some 
practice approaches to strategic spatial planning (such as were intended in England, 
2004-2010) and what I had loosely termed a ‘multiplanar’ approach based on Deleuze and 
Guattari’s planes of immanence and organisation (Hillier, 2007, 2011b).
 As I wrote earlier in Chapter 4, the planes of immanence and organisation exist 
simultaneously and are interleaved, sometimes more closely than at other times, with force 
relations playing out on both planes. Humans and non-humans inhabit both planes at the 
same time. While a 15+ year strategic plan may describe a desired trajectory – towards 
sustainability for instance – localised plans, policies and projects are created as required to 
deal with details and specific issues. At the local scale, spatial planning is concerned with 
the active management and negotiation of space through Local Development Plans, major 
projects and Development Assessment processes. Planning practitioners have to make 
sense on a daily basis of the chaos of uncertainty wavering between rationality and irratio-
nality and attempting to make undecidable decisions: in effect, to plan (Hillier, 2007: 249).
 Inspired by Deleuze and Guattari, I have argued for broad trajectories/visions 
of strategic spatial planning to act as frames of reference (planes of immanence) for 
more specific local/short-term plans and projects (planes of organisation). The frames of 
reference (such as sustainability, habitability and so on) provide justification and naviga-
tional context for short- and medium-term substantive actions (such as major projects) 
which mark movement and change along the broader trajectory.
 I have attempted to translate this theoretical material into a practical metho-
dology of strategic navigation for strategic spatial planning (Hillier, 2011b), inspired by 
Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘pragmatics’. This is a reading of pragmatism which has at its core 
issues of power relations, politics, creative transformation and practical experimentation. 
 Deleuze and Guattari regard their ‘pragmatics’ metaphorically as a form of 
 cartography. They describe their cartography as comprising four components (1987; 146):
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 • The generative component – the tracing of concrete mixed semiotics and   
  pointing towards the potentiality of what might emerge;
 • The transformational component – making a transformational map of the   
  regimes and their possibilities for translation and creation;
 • The diagrammatic component of the relational forces that are in play ‘either 
  as potentialities or as effective emergences’;
 • The machinic component – the outline of programmes of what new 
  assemblages/agencements might emerge.
 A cartographic method would first make a tracing of ‘how did something come 
to be’ which explores, in particular, the force relations between human and non-human 
actors. Tracing is concerned with understanding path dependencies, transformations and 
ruptures, investigating how elements and processes (such as human and non-human actors 
involved in policy-making for energy infrastructure provision or social housing location) 
respond to their  own relational logics and to external pressures and stimuli. Tracing, then, 
overlays a product (what happened) onto the process of its production (how it happened). 
One could use Foucauldian genealogy or actor-network approaches as a methodology for 
tracing.
 Deleuzoguattarian mapping involves the creative discovery and perception of 
landmarks, useful for orientation purposes as something to head towards. This would not 
be an attempt to define long-term detailed programs of action, but to raise questions of 
potential agency and of socio-economic-political and institutional conditions of change. 
For instance, what might be the implications of a Russian gas magnate taking ownership 
of a local football or ice hockey club with visions of expansion? Or a celebrity-led fringe 
political party holding the balance of power?
 Mapping generates a diagram of the discursive and material forces expressing 
immanent relations of power. Deleuze (2003: 101) describes a diagram as being ‘suggestive’ 
of ‘possibilities of facts’. It would help evaluation of the organisational potentiality of 
various strategic agencements to emerge, such as the fringe political party. The idea is to 
attempt to anticipate the ways in which force relations and alliances might be redistri-
buted in different circumstances and situations and to work out what kinds of changes in 
relations between humans and non-humans could be vitally important (eg discovery of 
seams of oil shale beneath good quality agricultural land): ‘it is never filiations which are 
important, but alliances’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 69).
 Deleuze and Guattari’s machinic component concerns the evaluative study of 
assemblages/agencements and their potentialities with a view to intervening strategically. 
This is an ethical issue, as are all strategic planning decisions. One way of machining new 
strategic spatial planning programs could be through prospective or strategic foresighting 
(see Albrechts, 2005, 2006, 2008; Hames, 2007). 
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 Key elements, in diagramming and machining in particular, are questions of 
‘what might happen if …? However, this questioning is very different to that generally 
associated with more rational comprehensive forms of strategic planning. Deleuze 
and Guattari emphasise the importance of the force relations between elements rather 
than simply the elements themselves. Rational comprehensive modes of planning also 
rarely look backwards at force relations, generally performing trend analysis on data. A 
Deleuzoguattarian-inspired analysis would look at more than just the numbers. It would 
look at how those numbers actualised: what were the conditions of their possibility. 
Why, for instance, was their an apparent spike in high-rise residential apartment block 
construction in the last three years? Is this a reliable trend? Have the conditions underlying 
the construction rate ceased to operate, and so on. What are the force relations between, 
for instance, an interventionist Minister for Planning who calls in/determines planning 
applications, developers and their agents, local planning officers, construction companies, 
NIMBY inner suburb residents? Mapping would similarly look at the force relations 
between elements. 
 Deleuze and Guattari’s pragmatic cartography resonates extremely well with 
Richard Hames’6 (2007) methodology of strategic navigation, which I have developed 
for strategic spatial planning (Hillier, 2011b). Hames (2007: 228-229) defines  strategic 
navigation as ‘the art of confidently and ethically finding viable paths into the future, 
negotiating unknown terrain and unprecedented complexity while retaining integrity and 
relevance’; a definition which meshes well with the practice of strategic spatial planning. 
Hames advocates a methodology of ‘strategy-as-process’ – ‘a continuous braiding of intel-
ligence creation with insightful action’ (Hames, 2007: 81) – based on appreciation of a 
‘system’s (eg a city or region) past, present and potential futures. Hames’ four components 
of sensing, making sense, designing and enacting fit closely with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
four components of pragmatic cartography. (See Hillier, 2011b, for detailed questions 
which planners might pursue in practising strategic navigation.)
 Tracing – Hames’ sensing – offers us a temporarily stabilised grid of reference 
for understanding what took place. Practitioners can then make sense of this through 
identifying patterns of behaviour and activity and reperceiving issues in the light of this 
information, thereby deepening their awareness and understanding of what went on, how 
and why. We may be able to understand, for instance hypothetically, why one particular 
interest group (which we had anticipated would have a major impact on governance) faded 
into the background and remained an assemblage of elements, whilst a different group 
mobilised support from temporary alliances of highly diverse actors, generated strategic 
agency (agencement), deterritorialised the prevailing system and toppled the ruling regime. 
 Emphasis then shifts to designing - mapping the relational connections, to 
diagram potentialities. Background documents to plans would no longer be questions of 
land use per se, but of interrelationships between different actants (including land uses). 
6 Thanks to Cathy Wilkinson for drawing my attention to Hames’ work.
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Planners would ‘map out a range of circumstances’ (Deleuze, 1995: 26), situations and 
relations or lines. Mapping lines and diagrams of relations of power or forces enables 
construction of trajectories (strategic plans) representing desired futures. Then comes 
experimentation, testing out relations, recognising the limitations of particular constraints 
and attempting to work through enabling constraints where possible. Planners have to 
operate through some reductive, perspectival stabilisation of difference simply in order 
to cope. Some territorialisation is inevitable. Even so, no matter how much we map and 
diagram spaces of possibilities, there will always be the unknown. Enacting the plan 
becomes reflexive and adaptive as changes in context, agents and structures occur. For 
Deleuze, normativity and normative criteria are immanent: the conditions of producing 
something new (such as a plan, a district centre redevelopment etc) always change 
according to what has been produced already. Analytical critique, or evaluation, and 
creation are immanent processes.
 Strategic navigation is potentially an inclusive, democratic ‘what might happen 
if …?’ approach which allows disparate points of view to co-exist; which has a concern for 
indeterminate essences rather than ordered ones; for emergent properties rather than fixed 
ones; and for intuition and uncertainty, multiplicity and complexity rather than systematic 
predictabilities. Strategic spatial planning by strategic navigation is a performance of risk-
taking, of not being in total control, of transcending the technicalities of planning practice 
which demands that strategic spatial planners ‘step outside what’s been thought before, … 
venture outside what’s familiar and reassuring, … to invent new concepts for unknown 
lands’ (Deleuze, 1995: 103) and to allow possibilities for something new to emerge. As 
Rajchman (1998: 33) suggests, ‘the aim of the game is not to rediscover the eternal or the 
universal but to find the conditions under which something new may be created’. 
GA: In your work you suggest that planning is about working with the virtual i.e.
to imagine ‘what might be’ in the future (potentials). Could you give us some idea 
about the method or process we might use to imagine these potentials? And how 
we select which potentials should be used to form a strategic plan?
You also suggest that established methods of forecasting such as scenario-design
provide us with some approximation of a Deleuzian approach to planning. Does 
this mean that we can use established, forecasting methods and refer to them as 
Deleuzian, or are there some important differences that we must be wary of?  
JH: I think that one of the better techniques for working with the virtual is what the
French call ‘futuribles’ or ‘prospectifves’ or foresighting in English. The essence of 
this is foresight, not forecast. De Jouvenel (00: ) argues that foresight invites 
consideration of the future as immanent, something created dynamically, whereas 
forecasting tends to be built on transcendence, a future already largely decided by 
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trend extrapolation, ‘like a mystery that simply needs to be unravelled’. Prospectives 
involve an open exploration of the potential (and the impotential) of many possible 
futures (futuribles) through development of radically alternative exploratory 
scenarios. It involves an exploration of conjectures rather than of facts. They break 
with existing paradigms by forcing actors to think outside their usual assumptions.
Louis Albrechts (00: ) describes prospectif scenario-building as deriving 
from the observation that, given the impossibility of knowing how the future will 
play out, a useful strategic trajectory would ‘play out well across several possible 
futures’. This should develop openness to new ideas and explore potential areas or 
lines of resistance in a linking of critique and constructive vision (Albrechts, 00). 
As Albrechts explains, prospectives offer a way of attempting to make visible the 
potential forces which could lead the future in a range of directions, desirable and 
undesirable. ‘[Prospectives] identify contingent decisions by exploring what places/
institutions might do if certain circumstances were to arise; they enable us to reflect 
on a series of “what if” stories’ (Albrechts, 00: ). 
Prospectives, however, are far more than the usual form of scenarios which 
planning consultants often employ (typified by high, medium and low growth). 
Scenarios tend to be fairly restricted in what they envisage, whereas prospectives 
engage in ‘horizon-scanning’ (www.futuribles.com) and beyond, where anything and 
everything can be suggested. Participants then work through what might be the 
conditions of possibility and force relations between human and non-human actors 
for the suggestion to actualise. The participants can then begin to ‘anticipate’ the 
likelihood of these events happening. Those deemed ‘unlikely’ can be put to one 
side. But participants will have, at least, considered what might be recognisable 
signs of their eventuation, so that, on seeing signs of an ‘unlikely’ event, they can 
bring ‘plan c’ out of the filing system or off the proverbial back-burner. It’s a sort-of 
pre-anticipation of the unexpected.
For instance, in a prospective exercise, someone might suggest that within 0 
years, ‘the world will run out of oil’ or ‘the European Union will break up’. If we 
take the first hypothetical above, discussion would think through what would 
be the conditions of possibility or drivers (and in particular, the force relations 
between actors) for the world to run out of oil, and what would be the Strengths, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) of such circumstances. Or, if oil 
does not run out, but becomes a scarce commodity (perhaps the US stockpiles it, 
or an oil-rich state, such as Venezuela, nationalises oil production and refuses to 
sell to non-South American buyers), then some countries/groups/organisations/
individuals will not be able to access oil. Planners would need to start thinking 
through what oil does, how likely there are to be substitutable alternatives, with 
what impacts on whose lives, and what might be a strategy to deal with all this 
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for humans and non-humans to live together in an oil-less society. In this manner, 
prospectives can create awareness of ‘what might be’, offering an array of broad 
trajectories of possibilities which can open actors’ minds to the potential transfor-
mation of clichéd attitudes, norms and practices. ‘The objective is not to forecast 
the future, for no-one can tell what the future will be. The objective is to take 
responsibility as an organisation for the future’ (de Jouvenel, nda).
The English Department for Business, Innovation and Skills is actually undertaking 
some extremely impressive foresighting exercises through its Foresight Programme, 
not least of which was that on Land Use Futures in 010 (http://www.bis.gov.
uk/foresight/our-work/projects/published-projects/land-use-futures). 
 Mark Purcell (2013) has recently emphasised the becoming-revolutionary 
aspect of Deleuze and Guattari’s work, which I mentioned in the preceding Chapter. In 
Anti-Oedipus (1984) in particular, Deleuze and Guattari call for lines of flight to flee the 
State and capitalism. Purcell (2103: 14) reads this call in planning terms as a ‘stand against 
state-led planning of all kinds’ which ‘forces us to ask both existential questions about what 
planning is and normative questions about whether we should be planning at all’ (Purcell, 
2013: 1).
 I agree that as planning academics and practitioners we should be asking such 
questions irrespective of reading Deleuze and Guattari. I also agree that Deleuze and 
Guattari write about revolutionary-becoming in Anti-Oedipus in such terms as Purcell 
describes, with regard to the importance of warding off apparatuses of capture and 
enabling those with a stake in issues to make decisions. However, I believe that a call for 
a revolutionary overturning of the state and capitalism7 reflects the mood of left-inspired 
academics in the late 1960s and 1970s (Anti-Oedipus was originally published in 1972). 
For planners to read Deleuze and Guattari entirely in the light of advocating ‘unres-
trained deterritorialisation of desire’ (Nail, 2012: 17) in the 21st Century, could, I suggest, 
be counterproductive and lead to a wholesale rejection of Deleuze and Guattari’s work. 
Instead, I read ‘becoming-revolutionary’ more in the constructive sense of A Thousand 
Plateaus (1987) – which is very different in tone to Anti-Oedipus – as transforming rather 
than abolishing molar organisation (see also Nail, 2012; Patton, 2000, 2012).
7 However, the rise of the bitcoin (BTC) as a digital currency and anonymous, peer-to-peer, electronic 
payments system based on an open source encryption protocol, not managed by any central authority, 
could be regarded as potentially a major challenge to the capitalist system. The global circulation 
of bitcoins as of April 2013 is worth over $1.4 billion US dollars on paper. Despite being originally 
developed as a system of rewards for computer-geeks who solved difficult mathematical problems, 
their value has increased exponentially from less than $1 US in 2011 each to $160 in April 2013, 
reflecting the limited number created. Bitcoins are rapidly becoming the currency of the super-rich in 
order to avoid taxation and other legislation (anon, 2013; Faiola and Farnam, 2013)
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 Deleuze and Guattari write about a conceptual apparatus for posing questions 
and rethinking, rather than prescribing normative end-points. As Patton (2008: 181) 
relates, Deleuze and Guattari present the state as ‘a new mechanism of alliance rather than 
the embodiment of any ideal treaty or contract on the part of its subjects’ (from Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1977: 195). This would be an alliance with new ideas proposed by, for 
instance, social movements, rather than attempts to capture and control them. Rather than 
being hostile to the idea of a democratic state, Deleuze and Guattari (1994) would rather it 
be reterritorialised along more socially and environmentally just lines. 
 Deleuze and Guattari also stress that where there is deterritorialisation, reter-
ritorialisation always occurs. Social movements which ‘fled’ an existing system, such as the 
Taliban in Afghanistan or groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and others, involved 
in the Arab Spring across North Africa, reterritorialise according to their own rules, which 
effectively reinvent the ‘despotic’ state in a different form and may not necessarily be an 
improvement for many affected humans and non-humans: ‘you can never guarantee a 
good outcome’ (Deleuze, 1995: 32). 
 As mentioned in Chapter 5, Deleuze and Guattari’s work resonates for some 
scholars with anarchism or anarcho-syndicalism. At this point it is useful to recall the 
origins of planning in Western Europe and the close relationship of Ebenezer Howard, 
Patrick Geddes and Lewis Mumford in the US to the anarchist philosophy of Pyotr 
Kropotkin and Élisée Reclus. The main inspiration of the anarchist movement was the 
creation, ‘on the very margins of the still existing state, of an alternative society, rather than 
the destruction of the physical infrastructure of the capitalist state’ (Tsekeris and Tsekeris, 
2007: 1). Perhaps the Transition Towns movement of the early 21st Century could be 
described as anarchist in this manner. Transition Towns are not without ‘rules’, however 
(see Scott-Cato and Hillier, 2010).
 Colin Ward taught and practised anarchist planning for over 50 years until his 
death in 2010 (see, in particular, Ward, 1974, 1978, 1989, 2002) and there has been a recent 
revival of anarchism in geography (see Ince, 2010, 2012; Springer, 2012). Saul Newman’s 
paper in Planning Theory (2011) advocated a form of post-anarchist planning (post-
structuralist anarchism) and Todd May (2005) looks at urban renewal from an anarchist 
perspective. There is even an anarchist planning website (www.anarchistplanner.org). 
Perhaps Deleuzoguattarian-inspired anarchist-type planning may not be an impossibility?
 Can there be too much autonomy? Why should stakeholders desire be creative 
and liberating? Elsewhere I offer some examples (Hillier, 2002) of poor technical planning 
decisions being made and supported by West Australian Ministers for Planning for 
populist reasons. 
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 Noam Chomsky (1999) suggests that Israeli kibbutzim come close to his ideal 
of anarcho-syndicalism (organised networks of small groups). For Chomsky, anarchism is 
not incompatible with state support for social justice: ‘it leads directly to support for the 
people facing problems today: for enforcement of health and safety regulations, provision 
of national health insurance, support systems for people who need them’ (1996: np). And 
spatial planning, one might suggest.
 There are several examples of creative alternatives to decision making ranging 
from participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, which has now spread to cities 
internationally and is widely documented,8 to J.K. Gibson-Graham’s empirical work on 
alternative economies in Australia and the USA (see, for example, Gibson-Graham, 2008, 
2011 and www.communityeconomies.org ). There is also rising support amongst public 
administration and planning academics and agencies of governance for what Sørensen and 
Torfing (2007) term ‘network governance’. Wachhaus (2011) advocates an anarchist model 
of network governance as appropriate to the regional scale, citing the European Union 
doctrine of subsidiarity as a workable example.
 Anarchist thinking also possibilises rethinking territory as a relational inter-
action between space and society, as Deleuze and Guattari would advocate. Ince (2012: 
1653) explains how an anarchist approach can afford tools for conceiving territorialisation 
as ‘a potentially liberating practice’. Ince suggests that it may be possible to embed within 
territorial practice ‘certain organisational functions and structures that are at once effective 
in building spaces of struggle and developing modes of organisation that prefigure future 
worlds’ (ibid). This could be undertaken through promoting and practising collective 
self-management of issues whilst retaining critical engagement with broader statist-
capitalist society (Notes from Nowhere, 2003). Critical engagement here does not imply 
subordination to statist notions of territory, but rather a notion of territory as a praxis 
produced through the spatiality of relations, which can ‘open up our spatial and political 
imaginations to radical alternatives’ (Ince, 2012: 1646).
 Well-known examples include the Occupy movement and the Zapatista Councils 
of Good Government in Chiapas, Mexico (see Chapter 5). Over 2,200 communities 
(more than 200,000 people) in Chiapas are federated into 38 ‘autonomous municipalities’ 
grouped into five local self-governments or Councils of Good Government which espouse 
collective decision making, prioritisation of women and marginalised peoples, co-operative 
economics and environmental stewardship. The Zapatistas have invented a form of 
prefigurative politics: without overthrowing the state, they have achieved a large degree of 
autonomy within it, and with others outside it (Nail, 2012). One of the key tenets of good 
governance in Chiapas is a responsibility to human and non-human others; something 
which the rest of the world could perhaps learn.
8 A Google Scholar search in April 2013 found over 30,000 texts on the topic.
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 In England, the Localism movement, commenced under the Labour regime in 
the early 2000s and continued by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition, could 
possibly offer an example of stakeholder-led planning practice, if centralised directive 
‘guidance’ and performance indicators were removed, which the Coalition government, 
in particular, wields as a stick (see Healey, 2011) and also provided that decisions are not 
dominated by powerful lobby groups, NIMBYs and/or ‘the usual suspects’, but are inclusive 
and democratic.
 So, what can Deleuzoguattarian-inspired planning do? 
 Deleuze and Guattari did intend that every space should be smooth, but stressed 
the interrelationships between smooth and striated space. Their work – especially their 
constructivist pragmatics or cartography – offers us a potential methodology to ‘intervene 
in the mixture of smoothing and striating forces at work in the complex spaces we inhabit’ 
(Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 39). What is important is that the assemblages with which, and 
within which, spatial planners work, and the interventions which they make, should aim to 
be enabling rather than restrictive: puissant rather than pouvant.
 Deleuze and Guattari’s planes of immanence and organisation are simultaneously 
interwoven to mutually collude in planning and governance practices. Organisational 
rules, regarded as a codifying reaction to emergence (eg use classes, design guidelines etc) 
are immanent in their practical local expressions. The rules thus become an integral part 
of practice without ceasing to be an organisational intervention. Organisation, as such, 
becomes-immanent in practical local expressions. This is an empiricism which unfolds 
rhizomically, in lines and connections emanating from a middle without ends; a conse-
quentialist approach of what might happen if …? 
 I would describe planning and governance practices as a kind of democratic, 
inclusive, ‘spatial investigation’9 proceeding by speculation, experiment and induction, 
which allows disparate points of view to coexist; which has a concern for indeterminate 
essences rather than contoured, ordered ones; for dynamic or emergent properties rather 
than fixed ones; and for allowing intuition and uncertainty, multiplicity and complexity 
rather than systematic certainties.
 Deleuze (Deleuze and Foucault, 1977) argues for practical-theoretical relays 
which can transform the world using both theory and practice together. Theory does 
not cause praxis, nor praxis theory: ‘both are heterogeneous components constitutive 
of revolutionary strategy’ (Nail, 2012: 7). There should be no universal scientific models 
dogmatically applied. Planning academics and practitioners need to develop new concepts 
that help them to articulate and understand the force relations of situations, not merely to 
describe them or to assume they can be ‘solved’. As such, the work of Deleuze and Guattari 
9 I use the term ‘investigation’ in the transactional sense that regards knowledge as vicarious 
experience created in interaction among ‘investigators’.
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may offer a point of mobilisation for rethinking planning theory and practice and the 
relays between them. 
GA: The question I would like us to explore concerns the way we might make
Deleuze useful to planning, and how viable this project is. Over the last few years 
there has been a growing interest in Deleuze’s philosophy. Some of Deleuze’s core 
concepts have been used to set out new ways of working in the spatial and social 
disciplines (Bonta and Protevi, 00; Coleman and Ringrose, 01.) Yet, many of 
these studies use Deleuze as an analytical or/and critical framework: concepts that 
help them understand the way the world around us comes into being and changes 
over time.  But there are far fewer examples of studies aimed at using Deleuze as 
a framework for engagement: for setting-up new forms of practice, particularly in 
spatial planning. 
Why do you think this is? Is it because Deleuze’s philosophy is more suited to 
analysis than engagement, after all most of Deleuze’s work could be seen as analy-
tically focused (schizoanalysis, rhizoanalysis etc)? Or is it because most spatial 
disciplines like planning have been reluctant, or unable, to make this move from 
analysis to engagement?
JH: I think that Deleuze and Guattari’s work is of potential importance in helping
planning researchers and practitioners to understand our worlds and environments. 
Moving from understanding (which is, of course, a form of engagement) to practical 
action is inevitably challenging, whether or not one is engaging a Deleuzean frame.
We know that both Deleuze and Guattari were on the barricades in Paris in 1 
and that Guattari, in particular, practised at La Borde clinic and was engaged in 
political and environmental activism. But, as Smith (01: 1) points out, one rarely 
finds ‘positions’ in Deleuze’s work: ‘rather to read or write on Deleuze is to trace 
trajectories whose directions are not given in advance of one’s reading or writing’. 
Reading or writing Deleuze is, therefore, itself a becoming, a production of the new. 
There is quite a lot of debate about whether Deleuze and Guattari’s work is 
normative. I think that their genealogical method of understanding (tracing) could be 
regarded as normative in that it suggests a useful approach to evaluate processes 
and events with regard to future-thinking. 
Todd May (11, 00) argues that Deleuze and Guattari have normative views 
in that they suggest that we experiment with possibilities. Others reply that, yes, 
Deleuze told us to ‘experiment, never interpret’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 00: ), 
but he did not tell us how. I think that this lack of direction offers us the flexibility to 
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work through for ourselves how we might experiment in different circumstances, 
rather than slavishly following some tick-box model or check-list, which is often 
what happens with ‘best practice’ – and ideas such as Alexander’s (1) Pattern 
Language – which tend to become off-the-peg templates despite never having been 
intended that way.
Deleuze and Guattari offer us a series of questions that we might ask (see Patton, 
00: ), which I have tried to translate into planning terms in a methodology of 
strategic navigation (Hillier, 011b). Questions like ‘what patterns of change can we 
identify?’ ‘Are force relations changing between actors?’ ‘How and why are these 
patterns changing?’ ‘What connections and disjunctions are occurring?’ ‘What 
control or influence can planners exercise over these issues and their relationships?’ 
and so on.
There are now quite a few examples of people engaging Deleuze and Guattari in 
art and architecture practice. Peter Eisenman’s Field of Stelae, for example. The 
Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin is a wonderful instance of the 
play of vertical and horizontal and of introducing fluidity to a grid. It is also really 
interesting to see how visitors engage with the installation: some wandering in 
quiet contemplation, children playing hide and seek, families sitting picnicking and 
couples disappearing into the shaded central area. People experiment with the 
space, public becomes private and vice versa, opening up subjectivities.
The military are increasingly using Deleuze and Guattari to inform practices of 
‘asymmetric warfare’ (see Weizman, 00) and dealing with counterinsurgency 
(Naím, 01). Naím’s book, in particular, demonstrates how centralised strategy-
making is eroding, not only in the military, but in corporate management and other 
spheres as well. Hyper-connectivity and instant global communication through 
mobile phones and the web have enabled the rise of effective ‘micropowers’. 
Naím shows how ‘the new breed of micropowers is opportunistically exploiting the 
weakness of entrenched but declining incumbents in disparate arenas. Insurgents, 
fringe political parties, innovative startups, hackers, loosely organised activists, 
upstart citizen media, leaderless young people in city squares’ and others are 
‘shaking up the old order’ (cited in Goldstein, 01: ). Very Deleuzean!
In education, researchers and practitioners are applying Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concepts in the classroom, such as practices of co-learning, co-creativity in group 
work(see, for example, Evans et al, 00), while Liane Mozère, who worked at 
La Borde with Guattari, has applied ideas of collective experimentation in early 
childhood education (Mozère, 00). Noel Gough seeks out multiple, hybrid connec-
tions between texts of science education, science media reports, social studies and 
sci-fi novels in a rhizomic manner, enabling students to better engage with texts 
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and to understand their relation to the ‘real world’ (Gough, 00, 00, 010). Many 
others have employed the Deleuzoguattarian concept of affect to engage students.
I have begun to explore the potential of affect in cultural heritage planning to 
attempt to make visitors think beyond the built form, to appreciate different stories 
and to challenge those who encounter the ‘heritage object’ to question their values, 
attitudes and actions. I have worked on this with regard to the incorporation of 
‘heritage’ elements of the former saleyards and abattoirs at Newmarket, Melbourne, 
into new residential estates, to encourage people to look beyond their meat, to 
the wider food production chain of animals, farming and slaughter. Similarly, I 
am looking at the role of the former Women’s Venereal Disease Clinic in central 
Melbourne in the early 0th Century nexus between medicine/health, eugenics/
morality and development of planning regulations. The story also lends itself to 
problematisation of the subjectivation of women and prostitution as responsible for 
the spread of contagious disease.
I mentioned in the Chapter that Mark Purcell takes his reading, mainly of Anti-
Œdipus, as a call for a stand against State-led planning. As I attempted to explain, 
Deleuze and Guattari regard the ‘state’ as a particular form of institutional regime, 
derived from sets of social relations and which constructs certain coded represen-
tations and fixities. The state, then, is a process of institutional codifying, territoria-
lising, representing and fixing, rather than a ‘thing’ in itself. These processes can be 
challenged and destabilised as the examples in the Chapter illustrate.
Deleuze does not advocate revolution in the traditional sense of overthrow of the 
ruling regime or ‘redemptive violence’ (Tampio, 00). Tampio (00: 0) under-
stands ‘becoming-revolutionary’ as entailing ‘surveying the political landscape, 
attaining a certain degree of political power, inside or outside of the state, testing 
out new laws, policies and rhetorics, and preserving the admirable elements of the 
society in which one lives’.
There is, and can be, no one model of engagement. Strategic navigation, for 
instance, is a methodological tool-kit, a series of suggestions for practitioners to 
consider; to stimulate them to think about force relations rather than entities.
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